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Tenure In Agricultural Economics: A Five-Year Review

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  • Boehlje, Michael
  • Levins, Richard A.

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Boehlje, Michael & Levins, Richard A., 1990. "Tenure In Agricultural Economics: A Five-Year Review," Staff Papers 14095, University of Minnesota, Department of Applied Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:umaesp:14095
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.14095
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    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/14095/files/p90-55.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Carmichael, H Lorne, 1988. "Incentives in Academics: Why Is There Tenure?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(3), pages 453-472, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lydia Zepeda & Mary Marchant & Hui-Shung Chang, 1993. "The Status of Women Agricultural Economists in Academia," Review of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 15(3), pages 537-545.

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