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Does aversion to the sucker's payoff matter in public goods games?

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  • Bougherara, Douadia
  • Costa, Sandrine
  • Grolleau, Gilles
  • Ibanez, Lisette

Abstract

A usual explanation to low levels of contribution to public goods is the fear of getting the sucker’s payoff (cooperation by the participant and defection by the other players). In order to disentangle the effect of this fear from other motives, we design a public good game where people have an assurance against getting the sucker’s payoff. We show that contributions to the public good under this ‘protective’ design are significantly higher and interact with expectations on other individuals' contribution to the public good. Some policy implications and extensions are suggested.

Suggested Citation

  • Bougherara, Douadia & Costa, Sandrine & Grolleau, Gilles & Ibanez, Lisette, 2009. "Does aversion to the sucker's payoff matter in public goods games?," Working Papers 210401, Institut National de la recherche Agronomique (INRA), Departement Sciences Sociales, Agriculture et Alimentation, Espace et Environnement (SAE2).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:inrasl:210401
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.210401
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Simon Gachter & Ernst Fehr, 2000. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 980-994, September.
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    3. Amartya K. Sen, 1967. "Isolation, Assurance and the Social Rate of Discount," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 81(1), pages 112-124.
    4. Rachel T. A. Croson, 2007. "Theories Of Commitment, Altruism And Reciprocity: Evidence From Linear Public Goods Games," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 45(2), pages 199-216, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Delacote, Philippe & Montagné-Huck, Claire, 2012. "Political consumerism and public policy: Good complements against market failures?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(C), pages 188-193.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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