Contract Design and Targeting for the Production of Public Goods in Agriculture: The Impact of the 2003 Cap Reform
The objective of this paper is to compare different ways of designing agri-environmental contracts and to set targeting under adverse selection, comparing conditions before and after CAP reform 2003. The results suggest that the present contract structure may be relevantly improved through a more accurate design and a clearer target. The reform, through the decoupling mechanism, will contribute to reduce the opportunity cost of the adoption of agri-environmental measures. This may increase the optimal amount of public goods produced by agriculture and will encourage participation by farmers. However, in order to properly exploit the new conditions brought by the 2003 reform, it is necessary to review the way agri-environmental payments are assigned and their structure, in terms of targeting, contract differentiation and payment allocation.
|Date of creation:||2005|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.eaae.org|
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Uwe Latacz-Lohmann & Carel Van der Hamsvoort, 1997. "Auctioning Conservation Contracts: A Theoretical Analysis and an Application," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 79(2), pages 407-418.
- Claassen, Roger & Breneman, Vincent E. & Bucholtz, Shawn & Cattaneo, Andrea & Johansson, Robert C. & Morehart, Mitchell J., 2004. "Environmental Compliance In U.S. Agricultural Policy: Past Performance And Future Potential," Agricultural Economics Reports 34033, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
- Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, June.
- Andrew Moxey & Ben White & Adam Ozanne, 1999. "Efficient Contract Design for Agri-Environment Policy," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(2), pages 187-202.
- Chongwoo Choe & Iain Fraser, 1997.
"Compliance Monitoring and Agri-Environmental Policy,"
1997.08, School of Economics, La Trobe University.
- Chongwoo Choe & Iain Fraser, 1999. "Compliance Monitoring and Agri-Environmental Policy," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(3), pages 468-487.
- C. Choe & I. Fraser, 1998. "A Note on Imperfect Monitoring of Agri-Environmental Policy," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(2), pages 250-258.
- Uwe Latacz-Lohmann & Carel P. C. M. Hamsvoort, 1998. "Auctions as a Means of Creating a Market for Public Goods from Agriculture," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(3), pages 334-345.
- Ing-Marie Gren, 2004. "Uniform or discriminating payments for environmental production on arable land under asymmetric information," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 31(1), pages 61-76, March.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:eaae05:24559. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (AgEcon Search)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.