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A Game Theoretic Model Of Agricultural And Food Price Policies In Senegal

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  • Beghin, John C.
  • Karp, Larry S.

Abstract

A game theoretic model of the political economy of agricultural and food price policies in Senegal is proposed. A cooperative bargaining game is used to describe and estimate the relative bargaining strength of three representative players: the fanners producing groundnuts and millet and consuming fertilizer; urban dwellers consuming imported rice and wheat; and a small set of governmental institutions intervening in these markets. Farmers are shown to have about twice as much bargaining power as urban consumers or the governmental agencies involved in the game. The bargaining power structure is influenced by changes in exogenous variables such as the world price of commodities, exchange rate and population. The bargaining power of farmers is positively influenced by increases in the world price of rice and groundnuts; urban consumers' strength is weakened by the same exogenous changes. The opposite results are obtained for increases in the foreign exchange rate and population.

Suggested Citation

  • Beghin, John C. & Karp, Larry S., "undated". "A Game Theoretic Model Of Agricultural And Food Price Policies In Senegal," 1988 Annual Meeting, August 1-3, Knoxville, Tennessee 270316, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea88:270316
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.270316
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Nash, John, 1953. "Two-Person Cooperative Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 21(1), pages 128-140, April.
    2. Rausser, Gordon C & Freebairn, John W, 1974. "Estimation of Policy Preference Functions: An Application to U.S. Beef Import Quotas," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 56(4), pages 437-449, November.
    3. Thomson, William, 1981. "A class of solutions to bargaining problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 431-441, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Rausser, Gordon C. & de Gorter, Harry, "undated". "Endogenizing Policy In Models Of Agricultural Markets," 1988 Annual Meeting, August 1-3, Knoxville, Tennessee 270460, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    2. Beghin, John C., "undated". "Towards a Theoretical Framework for Policy Behavioral Equations," Department of Economics and Business - Archive 259443, North Carolina State University, Department of Economics.
    3. Golan EH., 1992. "Soil conservation and sustainable development in the Sahel: a study of two Senegalese villages," ILO Working Papers 992899173402676, International Labour Organization.
    4. repec:ilo:ilowps:289917 is not listed on IDEAS

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