Double Dipping In Pollution Markets
We explore the efficiency of allowing participants in transferable-rights programs to sell credits in multiple markets, i.e., to double dip. In a first-best economy double-dipping is efficient, but if the cap is set suboptimally, then the answer depends on the relative slopes of the marginal benefit and marginal cost curves.
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- Erik Schmieman & Ekko van Ierland & Leen Hordijk, 2002. "Dynamic Efficiency with Multi-Pollutants and Multi-Targets The Case of Acidification and Tropospheric Ozone Formation in Europe," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 23(2), pages 133-148, October.
- Montgomery, W. David, 1972. "Markets in licenses and efficient pollution control programs," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 395-418, December.
- Donald N. Dewees, 2001.
"Emissions Trading: ERCs or Allowances?,"
University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 77(4), pages 513-526.
- Helfand, Gloria E, 1991. "Standards versus Standards: The Effects of Different Pollution Restrictions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 622-34, June.
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