IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/adv/wpaper/201402.html

Information technologies and provision of national identificacion cards by the Bolivian Police: Evidence from two randomized natural field experiments

Author

Listed:
  • Alberto Chong

    (Elliott School of International A airs, George Washington University)

  • Gustavo Machicado Salas

    (Institute for Advanced Development Studies (INESAD))

  • Monica Yanez-Pagans

    (Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network, The World Bank)

Abstract

This paper investigates the potential of information technologies to improve public service delivery and empower citizens in the context of two unusual randomized natural experiments occurring within one particular bureaucratic process: the renewal of a national identification card by the Bolivian Police. The first experiment arises from the random assignment of both police officers and applicants to a manual or digital renewal process, which is identical in all aspects except that the digital renewal process makes use of information technologies as part of the renewal process. The second experiment arises by the existence of technical failures within the digital renewal process, which allows police officers to change from the digital to the manual renewal process randomly across renewal day. The efficiency of public service delivery is measured in terms of both renewal success rates (which average to a strikingly low rate of 72 percent in our sample) and time-it-takes to renew an identification card. The causal effect of information technologies on public service delivery is estimated using two different identification strategies. In the first one, applicant-police oficer pairs randomly assigned to each one of these two renewal processes are compared after controlling for renewal day fixed effects. In the second one, applicant-police officer pairs randomly assigned to the digital process are compared to those randomly assigned to this same process but who experienced a technical failure within the process, which allows to directly control for unobserved heterogeneity at the police officer level. We find that information technologies significantly improve the quality of public service delivery. Applicants randomly assigned to the digital renewal process are on average 12 percentage points more likely to complete the renewal process as compared to those randomly assigned to the manual one. Further, successful applicants randomly assigned to the digital process take on average 31 percent less time to complete the process as compared to those randomly assigned to the manual one. Lastly, we find that information technologies significantly lower barriers in access to national identification cards by promoting a more equitable provision across the population. We discuss several channels through which technologies might be improving efficiency and promoting equity within this particular bureaucratic process. Overall, our findings suggest that information technologies might be achieving these goals by introducing efficiencies (such as reducing administrative shortcomings and transaction costs), and limiting the exercise of discretion by police officers within the renewal process.

Suggested Citation

  • Alberto Chong & Gustavo Machicado Salas & Monica Yanez-Pagans, 2014. "Information technologies and provision of national identificacion cards by the Bolivian Police: Evidence from two randomized natural field experiments," Development Research Working Paper Series 02/2014, Institute for Advanced Development Studies.
    • Handle: RePEc:adv:wpaper:201402
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.inesad.edu.bo/pdf/wp2014/wp02_2014.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Suzanne Duryea & Analía Olgiati & Leslie Stone, 2006. "The Under-Registration of Births in Latin America," Research Department Publications 4443, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
    2. Stephen Machin & Sandra McNally & Olmo Silva, 2007. "New Technology in Schools: Is There a Payoff?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(522), pages 1145-1167, July.
    3. Griliches, Zvi, 1998. "R&D and Productivity," National Bureau of Economic Research Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226308869, August.
    4. Sequeira, Sandra & Djankov, Simeon, 2010. "An Empirical Study of Corruption in Ports," MPRA Paper 21791, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Paul Schreyer, 2000. "The Contribution of Information and Communication Technology to Output Growth: A Study of the G7 Countries," OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working Papers 2000/2, OECD Publishing.
    6. Jakob Svensson, 2003. "Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross Section of Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(1), pages 207-230.
    7. Zvi Griliches, 1998. "R&D and Productivity: The Econometric Evidence," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number gril98-1, January.
    8. Alessandra Colecchia & Paul Schreyer, 2001. "ICT Investment and Economic Growth in the 1990s: Is the United States a Unique Case? A Comparative Study of Nine OECD Countries," OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working Papers 2001/7, OECD Publishing.
    9. Draca, Mirko & Sadun, Raffaella & Van Reenen, John, 2006. "Productivity and ICT: A Review of the Evidence," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 4561, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    10. W. Douglass Shaw, 1992. "Searching for the Opportunity Cost of an Individual's Time," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 68(1), pages 107-115.
    11. Bruno Frey, 1971. "Why do high income people participate more in politics?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 11(1), pages 101-105, September.
    12. Benjamin A. Olken & Patrick Barron, 2009. "The Simple Economics of Extortion: Evidence from Trucking in Aceh," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 117(3), pages 417-452, June.
    13. Fisman, Raymond & Svensson, Jakob, 2007. "Are corruption and taxation really harmful to growth? Firm level evidence," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 63-75, May.
    14. Zvi Griliches, 1998. "Productivity, R&D, and the Data Constraint," NBER Chapters, in: R&D and Productivity: The Econometric Evidence, pages 347-374, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Chong, Alberto & Machicado, Carlos Gustavo & Yanez-Pagans, Monica, 2014. "Information Technologies and Provision of National Identification Cards by the Bolivian Police: Evidence from Two Randomized Natural Field Experiments," IZA Discussion Papers 7975, IZA Network @ LISER.
    2. Bernard Gauthier & Jonathan Goyette, 2016. "Fiscal policy and corruption," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 57-79, January.
    3. Benjamin A. Olken & Rohini Pande, 2012. "Corruption in Developing Countries," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 4(1), pages 479-509, July.
    4. M. Shahe Emran & Asadul Islam & Forhad Shilpi, 2020. "Distributional Effects of Corruption When Enforcement is Biased: Theory and Evidence from Bribery in Schools in Bangladesh," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 87(348), pages 985-1015, October.
    5. Beekman, Gonne & Bulte, Erwin H. & Nillesen, Eleonora E.M., 2013. "Corruption and economic activity: Micro level evidence from rural Liberia," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 70-79.
    6. M. Shahe Emran & Asadul Islam & Forhad Shilpi, 2013. "Admission is Free Only if Your Dad is Rich! Distributional Effects of Corruption in Schools in Developing Countries," Monash Economics Working Papers 11-13, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    7. Krisztina Kis-Katos & Günther G. Schulze, 2013. "Corruption in Southeast Asia: a survey of recent research," Asian-Pacific Economic Literature, The Crawford School, The Australian National University, vol. 27(1), pages 79-109, May.
    8. Paul A. David, "undated". "Zvi Griliches and the Economics of Technology Diffusion: Adoption of Innovations, Investment Lags, and Productivity Growth," Discussion Papers 09-016, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research, revised Mar 2010.
    9. Amodio, Francesco & Choi, Jieun & De Giorgi, Giacomo & Rahman, Aminur, 2022. "Bribes vs. taxes: Market structure and incentives," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 435-453.
    10. Ugur, Mehmet & Guidi, Francesco & Solomon, Edna & Trushin, Eshref, 2014. "R&D investment, productivity and rates of return: A meta-analysis of the evidence on OECD firms and industries," MPRA Paper 59686, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 22 Oct 2014.
    11. Clemens Struck & Adnan Velic, 2017. "To Augment Or Not To Augment? A Conjecture On Asymmetric Technical Change," Trinity Economics Papers tep0117, Trinity College Dublin, Department of Economics.
    12. Marjit Sugata & Thum Marcel & Seidel André, 2017. "Tax Evasion, Corruption and Tax Loopholes," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 18(3), pages 283-301, August.
    13. Athanasouli, Daphne & Goujard, Antoine, 2015. "Corruption and management practices: Firm level evidence," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(4), pages 1014-1034.
    14. Gauthier, Bernard & Goyette, Jonathan & Kouamé, Wilfried A.K., 2021. "Why do firms pay bribes? Evidence on the demand and supply sides of corruption in developing countries," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 190(C), pages 463-479.
    15. Stavins, Robert & Jaffe, Adam & Newell, Richard, 2000. "Technological Change and the Environment," Working Paper Series rwp00-002, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    16. Bernard GAUTHIER & Frédéric LESNÉ, 2018. "Reported Corruption vs. Experience of Corruption in Public Procurement Contracts," Working Papers P242, FERDI.
    17. Dmitry Ryvkin & Danila Serra, 2019. "Is More Competition Always Better? An Experimental Study Of Extortionary Corruption," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 57(1), pages 50-72, January.
    18. Joseph Olorunfemi Akande & Farai Kwenda, 2017. "Competition and Stability of Sub-Saharan African Commercial Banks; a GMM Analysis," Acta Universitatis Danubius. OEconomica, Danubius University of Galati, issue 13(2), pages 122-138, April.
    19. Furman, Jeffrey L. & Porter, Michael E. & Stern, Scott, 2002. "The determinants of national innovative capacity," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 899-933, August.
    20. Chinloy, Peter & Jiang, Cheng & John, Kose, 2020. "Investment, depreciation and obsolescence of R&D," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 49(C).

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;

    JEL classification:

    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • O38 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Government Policy
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:adv:wpaper:201402. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Lykke Andersen (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/inesabo.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.