International Prudential Regulation, Regulatory Risk and the Cost of Bank Capital
We define regulatory risk as any regulatory action that leads to an increase in the cost of capital for the regulated firm. In a general equilibrium setting the paper considers the impact of globally harmonising capital adequacy requirements on the cost of bank equity capital. The results show that uniform increases in capital requirements lead to an increase in the cost of capital. However when regulatory standards differ across countries, financial integration leads to positive spillovers which reduces the cost of capital mark up for a given increase in bank capital. Accordingly, regulatory risk may be greater under a regulatory agreement such as the Basel Accord which imposes international uniformity in capital ratios.
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