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Financial stability: To Regulate or Not? A public choice inquiry

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Abstract

The paper takes the stand that the central banks as financial regulators have their own interest in imposing more regulations. It models the institutional behaviour for the central bank and government using the Indirect Inference testing and estimation method as it finds a set of coefficients of the model that can generate the actual observed behaviour for the US. The paper establishes that good monetary policy can reduce instability. Regulation at worse destabilises the economy and at best contributes little to stabilise the economy. After the financial crisis, financial regulations were too severe and thus actually increased instability.

Suggested Citation

  • Le, Vo Phuong Mai & Meenagh, David & Minford, Patrick, 2018. "Financial stability: To Regulate or Not? A public choice inquiry," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2018/4, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
  • Handle: RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2018/4
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    File URL: http://carbsecon.com/wp/E2018_4.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Keeley, Michael C. & Furlong, Frederick T., 1990. "A reexamination of mean-variance analysis of bank capital regulation," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 69-84, March.
    2. Le, Vo Phuong Mai & Meenagh, David & Minford, Patrick & Wickens, Michael, 2017. "A Monte Carlo procedure for checking identification in DSGE models," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 202-210.
    3. Tayler, William J. & Zilberman, Roy, 2016. "Macroprudential regulation, credit spreads and the role of monetary policy," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 26(C), pages 144-158.
    4. Barth, James R. & Caprio, Gerard Jr. & Levine, Ross, 2004. "Bank regulation and supervision: what works best?," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 205-248, April.
    5. Goodhart, Charles & Schoenmaker, Dirk, 1995. "Should the Functions of Monetary Policy and Banking Supervision Be Separated?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 47(4), pages 539-560, October.
    6. Le, Vo Phuong Mai & Meenagh, David & Minford, Patrick, 2016. "Monetarism rides again? US monetary policy in a world of Quantitative Easing," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 85-102.
    7. Kahane, Yehuda, 1977. "Capital adequacy and the regulation of financial intermediaries," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 1(2), pages 207-218, October.
    8. Furlong, Frederick T. & Keeley, Michael C., 1989. "Capital regulation and bank risk-taking: A note," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(6), pages 883-891, December.
    9. Alan S. Blinder, 2010. "It’s Broke, Let’s Fix It: Rethinking Financial Regulation," International Journal of Central Banking, International Journal of Central Banking, vol. 6(34), pages 277-330, December.
    10. Blum, Jurg, 1999. "Do capital adequacy requirements reduce risks in banking?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(5), pages 755-771, May.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    DSGE; Regulations; Financial Stability; Monetary Policy;

    JEL classification:

    • E10 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - General Aggregative Models - - - General
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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