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Bank capital and equity investment regulations

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An intermediation model that examines the efficiency and welfare implications of banks' required capital-asset ratio and of the regulations that limit - and in some countries forbid - banks' investments in equity to a certain proportion of each firm's capital. ; A look at how episodes of competing currencies can provide insight on 1) the qualities of a commodity that lead to its becoming a dominant currency, 2) the route by which a nationally mandated paper currency becomes acceptable as a medium of exchange, and 3) the way in which competition between currencies sustains the exchange value of a fiat currency by restricting the actions available to the monetary authority. ; A look at how episodes of competing currencies can provide insight on 1) the qualities of a commodity that lead to its becoming a dominant currency, 2) the route by which a nationally mandated paper currency becomes acceptable as a medium of exchange, and 3) the way in which competition between currencies sustains the exchange value of a fiat currency by restricting the actions available to the monetary authority.

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  • João A. C. Santos, 1995. "Bank capital and equity investment regulations," Working Papers (Old Series) 9515, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedcwp:9515
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    Bank capital; Bank investments;

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