Bounded Rationality in the Economics of Organization Present Use and (Some) Future Possibilities
The way in which bounded rationality enters contemporary organizational economics theorizing is examined. It is argued that, as it is being used, bounded rationality is neither necessary nor sufficient for producing the results of organizational economics. It is at best a rhetorical device, used for the purpose of loosely explaining incomplete contracts. However, it is possible to incorporate much richer notions of bounded rationality, founded on research in cognitive psychology, and to illuminate the study of economic organization by means of such notions. A number of examples are provided.
|Date of creation:||2001|
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- Nicolai J. Foss, 1996. "Firms, Incomplete Contracts and Organizational Learning," DRUID Working Papers 96-2, DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies.
- Peter Maskell, 1996. "Localised Low-tech Learning in the Furniture Industry," DRUID Working Papers 96-11, DRUID, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Industrial Economics and Strategy/Aalborg University, Department of Business Studies.
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