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Governance of Financial Supervisors and its Effects - a Stocktaking Exercise

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  • Morten Balling

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Abstract

The attention for the governance of financial sector supervisors is of a recent date. The debate has risen to the fore as part of the wider discussion about the appropriate institutional organization of financial supervision and the drive for compliance with international best practices in the regulatory field. This paper takes stock of the regulatory governance debate. We first discuss the main premise of the paper, that regulatory governance plays a pivotal role in instilling financial sector governance, which in turn is a key source of corporate governance in the nonfinancial sector (the governance nexus). Having established this premise, we identify the main pillars for regulatory governance-independence, accountability, transparency, and integrity. The next two sections take a look at where we stand in practice. First, we review to what extent recent reforms of supervisory structures worldwide are embracing the four pillars underlying regulatory governance. We find that policy makers are gradually making efforts to improve the foundations for regulatory governance. However, further convincing, in particular of the beneficial effects of accountability, seems necessary. Secondly, we review a number of studies that assess the impact of (aspects of) regulatory governance on the soundness of the banking system (an indicator of good financial system corporate governance), or other aspects of the governance nexus. Most studies show a positive impact of stronger regulatory governance frameworks on the soundness of the financial system. However, further empirical evidence to strengthen the case for good regulatory governance seems desirable.

Suggested Citation

  • Marc Quintyn, 2007. "Governance of Financial Supervisors and its Effects - a Stocktaking Exercise," SUERF Studies, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum, number 2007/4 edited by Morten Balling, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:erf:erfstu:47
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1997. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Scholarly Articles 30728046, Harvard University Department of Economics.
    2. Mr. Michael W Taylor & Mr. Marc G Quintyn & Ms. Silvia Ramirez, 2007. "The Fear of Freedom: Politicians and the Independence and Accountability of Financial Sector Supervisors," IMF Working Papers 2007/025, International Monetary Fund.
    3. Marc Quintyn & Michael W. Taylor, 2003. "Regulatory and Supervisory Independence and Financial Stability," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 49(2), pages 259-294.
    4. Levine, Ross, 2005. "Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence," Handbook of Economic Growth, in: Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 12, pages 865-934, Elsevier.
    5. Richard Podpiera, 2004. "Does Compliance with Basel Core Principles Bring Any Measurable Benefits?," IMF Working Papers 2004/204, International Monetary Fund.
    6. Richard Podpiera, 2006. "Does Compliance with Basel Core Principles Bring Any Measurable Benefits?," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 53(2), pages 1-5.
    7. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
    8. Donato Masciandaro & Marc Quintyn (ed.), 2007. "Designing Financial Supervision Institutions," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 12684.
    9. Paolo Mauro, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Cited by:

    1. Masciandaro, Donato & Quintyn, Marc & Taylor, Michael W., 2008. "Inside and outside the central bank: Independence and accountability in financial supervision: Trends and determinants," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 833-848, December.
    2. Donato Masciandaro & Mr. Marc G Quintyn & Mr. Michael W Taylor, 2008. "Financial Supervisory Independence and Accountability–Exploring the Determinants," IMF Working Papers 2008/147, International Monetary Fund.
    3. Masciandaro, Donato & Nieto, Maria J. & Quintyn, Marc, 2011. "Exploring governance of the new European Banking AuthorityâA case for harmonization?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 7(4), pages 204-214, December.
    4. Sándor Gardó, 2010. "Bank Governance and Financial Stability in CESEE: A Review of the Literature," Focus on European Economic Integration, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank), issue 1, pages 6-31.
    5. Abel Mawuko Agoba & Joshua Yindenaba Abor & Kofi Achampong Osei & Jarjisu Sa-Aadu, 2020. "The Independence of Central Banks, Political Institutional Quality and Financial Sector Development in Africa," Journal of Emerging Market Finance, Institute for Financial Management and Research, vol. 19(2), pages 154-188, August.
    6. repec:onb:oenbwp:y:2010:i:1:b:1 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Marc Quintyn, 2009. "Independent agencies: more than a cheap copy of independent central banks?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 267-295, September.
    8. Masciandaro, Donato & Quintyn, Marc, 2008. "Helping hand or grabbing hand?: Politicians, supervision regime, financial structure and market view," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 153-173, August.
    9. Mr. Marc G Quintyn & Ms. Rosaria Vega Pansini & Donato Masciandaro, 2011. "The Economic Crisis: Did Financial Supervision Matter?," IMF Working Papers 2011/261, International Monetary Fund.
    10. Donato Masciandaro & Marc Quintyn, 2013. "The Evolution of Financial Supervision: the Continuing Search for the Holy Grail," SUERF 50th Anniversary Volume Chapters, in: Morten Balling & Ernest Gnan (ed.), 50 Years of Money and Finance: Lessons and Challenges, chapter 8, pages 263-318, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum.
    11. Donato Masciandaro & Maria J. Nieto & Marc Quintyn, 2011. "Will They Sing the Same Tune? Measuring Convergence in the New European System of Financial Supervisors," Chapters, in: Sylvester Eijffinger & Donato Masciandaro (ed.), Handbook of Central Banking, Financial Regulation and Supervision, chapter 17, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    12. Masciandaro, Donato & Pansini, Rosaria Vega & Quintyn, Marc, 2013. "The economic crisis: Did supervision architecture and governance matter?," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 9(4), pages 578-596.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Financial sector supervision; financial regulation; regulatory governance; corporate governance; public sector governance.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General

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