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Hauptsache in sich stimmig: Ein ökonomisches Experiment zu Lüge und Wahrheit

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  • Barron, Kai
  • Fries, Tilman

Abstract

Was bringt eine Anlegerin dazu, einer Beratung zu vertrauen und in eine bestimmte Firma zu investieren? Mit einem ökonomischen Experiment können Kai Barron und Tilman Fries zeigen, dass die Kohärenz der Argumentation eine wichtige Rolle spielt. Offensichtlich werden Lügen leicht geglaubt, wenn sie in ein überzeugendes Narrativ verpackt sind.

Suggested Citation

  • Barron, Kai & Fries, Tilman, 2022. "Hauptsache in sich stimmig: Ein ökonomisches Experiment zu Lüge und Wahrheit," WZB-Mitteilungen: Quartalsheft für Sozialforschung, WZB Berlin Social Science Center, issue 178 (4/22, pages 46-49.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:wzbmtn:327797
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sobel, Joel, 2020. "Lying and Deception in Games," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt0015j574, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
    2. Joshua Schwartzstein & Adi Sunderam, 2021. "Using Models to Persuade," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(1), pages 276-323, January.
    3. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-1451, November.
    4. Joel Sobel, 2020. "Lying and Deception in Games," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 128(3), pages 907-947.
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