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Repugnant transactions: The role of agency and severe consequences

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  • Erkut, Hande
  • Kübler, Dorothea

Abstract

Repugnance constrains market design because inacceptable or repugnant transactions must be avoided. To better understand what makes a transaction repugnant, we study two potential causes: limited agency, e.g., one party being forced to accept an offer, and severe consequences of the transaction. In a laboratory experiment, we find that spectators prohibit transactions with limited agency more frequently than with full agency, especially when the consequences are severe rather than mild. The main findings of the experiment are corroborated by a vignette study on the acceptability of kidney sales. The results point to policies that can mitigate repugnance.

Suggested Citation

  • Erkut, Hande & Kübler, Dorothea, 2026. "Repugnant transactions: The role of agency and severe consequences," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 157, pages 22-33.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:espost:339763
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2026.01.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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