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Equilibrium Selection In Stochastic Games

Author

Listed:
  • P. JEAN-JACQUES HERINGS

    (Department of Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands)

  • RONALD J. A. P. PEETERS

    (Department of Economics, Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands)

Abstract

In this paper a selection theory for stochastic games is developed. The theory itself is based on the ideas of Harsanyi and Selten to select equilibria for games in standard form. We introduce several possible definitions for the stochastic tracing procedure, an extension of the linear tracing procedure to the class of stochastic games. We analyze the properties of these alternative definitions. We show that exactly one of the proposed extensions is consistent with the formulation of Harsanyi–Selten for games in standard form and captures stationarity.

Suggested Citation

  • P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Ronald J. A. P. Peeters, 2003. "Equilibrium Selection In Stochastic Games," International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 5(04), pages 307-326.
    • Handle: RePEc:wsi:igtrxx:v:05:y:2003:i:04:n:s0219198903001082
    DOI: 10.1142/S0219198903001082
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, December.
    2. Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Peeters, Ronald J. A. P., 2004. "Stationary equilibria in stochastic games: structure, selection, and computation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 32-60, September.
    3. Andrew McLennan, 2005. "The Expected Number of Nash Equilibria of a Normal Form Game," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(1), pages 141-174, January.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Steffen Eibelshäuser & Victor Klockmann & David Poensgen & Alicia von Schenk, 2023. "The Logarithmic Stochastic Tracing Procedure: A Homotopy Method to Compute Stationary Equilibria of Stochastic Games," INFORMS Journal on Computing, INFORMS, vol. 35(6), pages 1511-1526, November.
    2. Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert, 2009. "Global Newton Method for stochastic games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 414-421, January.
    3. Ramsey, David M. & Szajowski, Krzysztof, 2008. "Selection of a correlated equilibrium in Markov stopping games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 184(1), pages 185-206, January.
    4. Murat Kurt & Mark S. Roberts & Andrew J. Schaefer & M. Utku Ünver, 2011. "Valuing Prearranged Paired Kidney Exchanges: A Stochastic Game Approach," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 785, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 14 Oct 2011.
    5. Cao, Yiyin & Dang, Chuangyin, 2022. "A variant of Harsanyi's tracing procedures to select a perfect equilibrium in normal form games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 134(C), pages 127-150.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Game theory; Stochastic games; equilibrium selection; linear tracing procedure; correlated beliefs; JEL classification code: C72; C73;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B4 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology
    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C6 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D5 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • M2 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics

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