IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Equilibrium Selection in Stochastic Games


  • P.Jean-Jacques Herings

    (University of Maastricht)

  • Ronald J.A.P. Peeters

    (University of Maastricht)


In this paper a selection theory for stochastic games is developed. The theory itself is based on the ideas of Harsanyi and Selten to select equilibria for games in standard form. We introduce several possible definitions for the stochastic tracing procedure, an extension of the linear tracing procedure to the class of stochastic games. We analyze the properties of these alternative definitions. We show that exactly one of the proposed extensions is consistent with the formulation of Harsanyi–Selten for games in standard form and captures stationarity.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • P.Jean-Jacques Herings & Ronald J.A.P. Peeters, 2001. "Equilibrium Selection in Stochastic Games," Game Theory and Information 0205002, EconWPA.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0205002
    Note: Type of Document - pdf.format; pages: 22 ; figures: i

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Andrew McLennan, 2005. "The Expected Number of Nash Equilibria of a Normal Form Game," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(1), pages 141-174, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)


    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Ramsey, David M. & Szajowski, Krzysztof, 2008. "Selection of a correlated equilibrium in Markov stopping games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 184(1), pages 185-206, January.
    2. Murat Kurt & Mark S. Roberts & Andrew J. Schaefer & M. Utku Ünver, 2011. "Valuing Prearranged Paired Kidney Exchanges: A Stochastic Game Approach," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 785, Boston College Department of Economics, revised 14 Oct 2011.

    More about this item


    Game theory; stochastic games; Equilibrium selection; Linear tracing procedure; Correlated beliefs;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0205002. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (EconWPA). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.