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What philosophy can teach political economy about corruption: A non‐ideal theory

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  • Mario I. Juarez‐Garcia

Abstract

Scholars who study political corruption typically assume that it is a pathology. This assumption gives rise to certain problems. On the one hand, scholars who conceive corruption as a principal‐agent problem yield anti‐corruption policies with disappointing results. On the other hand, political economists who grasp the functionality of corruption within inefficient institutions are torn between embracing the functionality of corrupt actions and eradicating them. These issues result from the assumption that corruption is a pathology. Philosophy operates at the level of assumptions, offering a potential avenue for addressing these issues. This paper puts forward a non‐ideal theory of corruption, in which partial compliance with the law is not always seen as a pathology; sometimes corruption includes information about the quality of the law. A non‐ideal theory of corruption puts forward the idea that some cases of corruption result from defective laws rather than defective people.

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  • Mario I. Juarez‐Garcia, 2025. "What philosophy can teach political economy about corruption: A non‐ideal theory," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 91(3), pages 969-987, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:soecon:v:91:y:2025:i:3:p:969-987
    DOI: 10.1002/soej.12692
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    References listed on IDEAS

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