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Coordination of Risk‐Averse Behaviors in a Green Supply Chain‐to‐Chain Competition

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  • Zhen Chen
  • Kaveh Khalilpour
  • Rui Zhao

Abstract

This research investigates the coordination of risk‐averse behaviors among members in green supply chain‐to‐chain competition. We establish models encompassing member rationality, manufacturer risk aversion, cost‐sharing contracts, and revenue‐sharing contracts, providing the optimal equilibrium results for each scenario. This paper compares the effectiveness of cost‐sharing versus revenue‐sharing contracts, finding that risk‐averse behavior diminishes profits, with total profits falling below those achieved under member rationality. Both contract types can facilitate coordination, but the revenue‐sharing contract proves more effective. Under the revenue‐sharing contract, wholesale and retail prices decrease, product greenness enhances, and profits for manufacturers, retailers, and the entire supply chain increase.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhen Chen & Kaveh Khalilpour & Rui Zhao, 2025. "Coordination of Risk‐Averse Behaviors in a Green Supply Chain‐to‐Chain Competition," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 46(5), pages 3142-3156, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:46:y:2025:i:5:p:3142-3156
    DOI: 10.1002/mde.4523
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