IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/jpamgt/v45y2026i1ne70060.html

Inferring the value of short‐staffed public sector jobs: Federal budgets and military fighter pilots

Author

Listed:
  • Scott Farrow
  • Peter B. Doeringer

Abstract

This study uses a novel framework based on the “negotiated staffing equilibrium” between governmental agencies and governing bodies to estimate the net benefits of increasing employment in public sector occupations that experience chronic labor shortages. The marginal values of these labor inputs, as perceived by the parties during budget negotiations, are inferred from information on the cost and productivity of labor in short supply compared to those values at the funded equilibrium employment level. If labor is not in short supply, then the net marginal benefits are either zero or negative. This model can be parameterized by elasticities and informed by principles of derived demand. The example of U.S. Air Force fighter pilots is used to illustrate the methodology because this occupation has frequently been understaffed, and the benefits of military staffing have generally been assumed to be intractable to value. The estimates here of the annual marginal net benefit of these fighter pilots is about $1.02 million, based on pilot shortages as of 2017. Eliminating that shortage would yield $458 million in additional net benefits. The results from estimating this model can inform labor allocations, budget debates and provide input values for decision‐making tools such as benefit‐cost analyses.

Suggested Citation

  • Scott Farrow & Peter B. Doeringer, 2026. "Inferring the value of short‐staffed public sector jobs: Federal budgets and military fighter pilots," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 45(1), January.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:jpamgt:v:45:y:2026:i:1:n:e70060
    DOI: 10.1002/pam.70060
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1002/pam.70060
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1002/pam.70060?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Asch, Beth J & Warner, John T, 2001. "A Theory of Compensation and Personnel Policy in Hierarchical Organizations with Application to the United States Military," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(3), pages 523-562, July.
    2. M. Bronfenbrenner, 1961. "Notes On The Elasticity Of Derived Demand," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 13(3), pages 254-261.
    3. H. Spencer Banzhaf, 2009. "Objective or Multi-Objective? Two Historically Competing Visions for Benefit-Cost Analysis," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 85(1), pages 3-23.
    4. Patrick Yeung, 1972. "A Note on the Rules of Derived Demand," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 86(3), pages 511-517.
    5. Bezalel Peleg & Peter Sudhölter, 2007. "Introduction to the Theory of Cooperative Games," Theory and Decision Library C, Springer, edition 0, number 978-3-540-72945-7, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Peter Knudsen & Lars Østerdal, 2012. "Merging and splitting in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(4), pages 763-774, November.
    2. Matthew F. Cancian & Michael W. Klein, 2015. "Military Officer Quality in the All-Volunteer Force," NBER Working Papers 21372, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Xia Zhang & René van den Brink & Arantza Estévez-Fernández, 2025. "The Prekernel of Cooperative Games with $$\alpha $$ α -Excess," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 206(3), pages 1-17, September.
    4. Tianhang Lu & Han Xian & Qizhi Fang, 2023. "Approximate Core Allocations for Edge Cover Games," Papers 2308.11222, arXiv.org.
    5. Michela Chessa & Nobuyuki Hanaki & Aymeric Lardon & Takashi Yamada, 2022. "Cost of complexity in implementing the Shapley value by choosing a proposer through a bidding procedure," ISER Discussion Paper 1176, Institute of Social and Economic Research, The University of Osaka.
    6. Michel Grabisch & Peter Sudhölter, 2012. "The bounded core for games with precedence constraints," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 201(1), pages 251-264, December.
    7. Lucian Mocrei-Rebrean, 2022. "The Lockean Proviso and Orbital Sustainability—An Anthropological View," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(7), pages 1-13, March.
    8. Johnsen, Åshild A. & Finseraas, Henning & Hanson, Torbjørn & Kotsadam, Andreas, 2026. "Corrigendum to “The malleability of competitive preferences” [Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics Volume 104 (2023) 102015]," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 120(C).
    9. Sheida Etemadidavan & Andrew J. Collins, 2021. "An Empirical Distribution of the Number of Subsets in the Core Partitions of Hedonic Games," SN Operations Research Forum, Springer, vol. 2(4), pages 1-20, December.
    10. Simeon Hagspiel, 2017. "Reliable Electricity: The Effects of System Integration and Cooperative Measures to Make it Work," EWI Working Papers 2017-13, Energiewirtschaftliches Institut an der Universitaet zu Koeln (EWI).
    11. H. Spencer Banzhaf, 2014. "Retrospectives: The Cold-War Origins of the Value of Statistical Life," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 28(4), pages 213-226, Fall.
    12. Calleja, Pedro & Llerena, Francesc & Sudhölter, Peter, 2021. "Axiomatizations of Dutta-Ray’s egalitarian solution on the domain of convex games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
    13. Matt Van Essen, 2024. "Equity Equilibrium for Cooperative Games," Working Papers 2024-04, University of Tennessee, Department of Economics.
    14. John Cawley & Stephanie von Hinke Kessler Scholder, 2013. "The Demand for Cigarettes as Derived from the Demand for Weight Control," NBER Working Papers 18805, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Jaeger, William K. & Egelkraut, Thorsten M., 2011. "Biofuel economics in a setting of multiple objectives and unintended consequences," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 15(9), pages 4320-4333.
    16. Harhoff, Dietmar, 1991. "R&D incentives and spillovers in a two-industry model," ZEW Discussion Papers 91-06, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    17. Bas Dietzenbacher & Peter Sudhölter, 2024. "Correction to: Hart–Mas-Colell consistency and the core in convex games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 53(2), pages 295-297, June.
    18. Carolus, Johannes Friedrich & Hanley, Nick & Olsen, Søren Bøye & Pedersen, Søren Marcus, 2018. "A Bottom-up Approach to Environmental Cost-Benefit Analysis," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 152(C), pages 282-295.
    19. Niklas Valentin Lehmann, 2025. "Smart treaties: A path to binding agreements in international relations?," Papers 2503.21516, arXiv.org.
    20. Aldred, Jonathan, 2013. "Justifying precautionary policies: Incommensurability and uncertainty," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 132-140.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:jpamgt:v:45:y:2026:i:1:n:e70060. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/34787/home .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.