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Agency governance and enforcement: the influence of mission on environmental decisionmaking

Author

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  • Jeremy Firestone

    (University of Delaware, Newark)

Abstract

Administrative agencies seeking to impose sanctions for regulatory violations can handle matters internally or through civil or criminal courts. Organizational culture, legal constraints, and political and private actors may influence governance and hence choice of enforcement venue. An enforcement behavior model is constructed and tested empirically using a 1990-1997 sample of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) air, water, and hazardous waste penalty cases involving individuals. While EPA's enforcement arm embraces the mission of its regulatory arm-minimizing environmental harm-in part, it also has attributes of a police and prosecution force-specifically deterring (and maximizing social welfare) or incapacitating individual violators. Nevertheless, EPA may fail to minimize violations of and generally deter non-culpable individuals who are affiliated with large firms. © 2002 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeremy Firestone, 2002. "Agency governance and enforcement: the influence of mission on environmental decisionmaking," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 21(3), pages 409-426.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:jpamgt:v:21:y:2002:i:3:p:409-426
    DOI: 10.1002/pam.10052
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Maria Francesch-Huidobro & Carlos Wing-Hung Lo & Shui-Yan Tang, 2012. "The Local Environmental Regulatory Regime in China: Changes in Pro-Environment Orientation, Institutional Capacity, and External Political Support in Guangzhou," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 44(10), pages 2493-2511, October.
    2. Lyton Chithambo & Venancio Tauringana & Ishmael Tingbani & Laura Achiro, 2022. "Stakeholder pressure and greenhouses gas voluntary disclosures," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(1), pages 159-172, January.
    3. Timo Goeschl & Ole Jürgens, 2014. "Criminalizing environmental offences: when the prosecutor’s helping hand hurts," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 37(2), pages 199-219, April.
    4. Sreejith Balasubramanian & Vinaya Shukla & Sachin Mangla & Janya Chanchaichujit, 2021. "Do firm characteristics affect environmental sustainability? A literature review‐based assessment," Business Strategy and the Environment, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(2), pages 1389-1416, February.
    5. Rousseau, Sandra, 2009. "Empirical Analysis of Sanctions for Environmental Offenses," International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, now publishers, vol. 3(3), pages 161-194, December.
    6. Nicole Darnall & Irene Henriques & Perry Sadorsky, 2010. "Adopting Proactive Environmental Strategy: The Influence of Stakeholders and Firm Size," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(6), pages 1072-1094, September.
    7. Arguedas, Carmen & Rousseau, Sandra, 2009. "A note on the complementarity of uniform emission standards and monitoring strategies," Working Papers 2009/12, Hogeschool-Universiteit Brussel, Faculteit Economie en Management.
    8. Christopher S. Decker, 2005. "Do Regulators Respond to Voluntary Pollution Control Efforts? A Count Data Analysis," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 23(2), pages 180-194, April.
    9. Carmen Arguedas & Dietrich Earnhart & Sandra Rousseau, 2017. "Non-uniform implementation of uniform standards," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 51(2), pages 159-183, April.
    10. Magnus Söderberg, 2008. "Uncertainty and regulatory outcome in the Swedish electricity distribution sector," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 79-94, February.
    11. Christopher S. Decker, 2006. "Implementing Environmental Regulation: An Inter-industry Analysis," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 32(1), pages 47-66, Winter.

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