IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/emetrp/v93y2025i1p161-194.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

How Well Does Bargaining Work in Consumer Markets? A Robust Bounds Approach

Author

Listed:
  • Joachim Freyberger
  • Bradley J. Larsen

Abstract

This study provides a structural analysis of detailed, alternating‐offer bargaining data from eBay, deriving bounds on buyers and sellers private value distributions and the gains from trade using a range of assumptions on behavior and the informational environment. These assumptions range from weak (assuming only that acceptance and rejection decisions are rational) to less weak (e.g., assuming that bargaining offers are weakly increasing in players' private values). We estimate the bounds and show what they imply for consumer negotiation behavior and inefficient breakdown. For the median product, bargaining ends in impasse in 37% of negotiations even when the buyer values the good more than the seller.

Suggested Citation

  • Joachim Freyberger & Bradley J. Larsen, 2025. "How Well Does Bargaining Work in Consumer Markets? A Robust Bounds Approach," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 93(1), pages 161-194, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:93:y:2025:i:1:p:161-194
    DOI: 10.3982/ECTA20125
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA20125
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.3982/ECTA20125?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
    2. Manski, Charles F, 1990. "Nonparametric Bounds on Treatment Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 319-323, May.
    3. Charles F. Manski, 1989. "Anatomy of the Selection Problem," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 24(3), pages 343-360.
    4. Gregory Lewis, 2011. "Asymmetric Information, Adverse Selection and Online Disclosure: The Case of eBay Motors," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(4), pages 1535-1546, June.
    5. Peter C. Cramton, 1992. "Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(1), pages 205-225.
    6. Aaron L Bodoh-Creed & Jörn Boehnke & Brent Hickman, 2021. "How Efficient are Decentralized Auction Platforms?," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(1), pages 91-125.
    7. Grossman, Sanford J. & Perry, Motty, 1986. "Sequential bargaining under asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 120-154, June.
    8. Gregory S. Crawford & Ali Yurukoglu, 2012. "The Welfare Effects of Bundling in Multichannel Television Markets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(2), pages 643-685, April.
    9. Bradley J Larsen, 2021. "The Efficiency of Real-World Bargaining: Evidence from Wholesale Used-Auto Auctions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(2), pages 851-882.
    10. Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April.
    11. Simon Loertscher & Leslie M. Marx, 2022. "Incomplete Information Bargaining with Applications to Mergers, Investment, and Vertical Integration," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(2), pages 616-649, February.
    12. Charles F. Manski & John V. Pepper, 2000. "Monotone Instrumental Variables, with an Application to the Returns to Schooling," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(4), pages 997-1012, July.
    13. Molinari, Francesca, 2020. "Microeconometrics with partial identification," Handbook of Econometrics, in: Steven N. Durlauf & Lars Peter Hansen & James J. Heckman & Rosa L. Matzkin (ed.), Handbook of Econometrics, edition 1, volume 7, chapter 0, pages 355-486, Elsevier.
    14. Bernardo S. Silveira, 2017. "Bargaining With Asymmetric Information: An Empirical Study of Plea Negotiations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 419-452, March.
    15. Elena Krasnokutskaya, 2011. "Identification and Estimation of Auction Models with Unobserved Heterogeneity," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 78(1), pages 293-327.
    16. Philip A. Haile & Elie Tamer, 2003. "Inference with an Incomplete Model of English Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(1), pages 1-51, February.
    17. Keisuke Hirano & Jack R. Porter, 2012. "Impossibility Results for Nondifferentiable Functionals," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(4), pages 1769-1790, July.
    18. Joachim Freyberger & Bradley J. Larsen, 2022. "Identification in ascending auctions, with an application to digital rights management," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 13(2), pages 505-543, May.
    19. McAfee, R Preston & Reny, Philip J, 1992. "Correlated Information and Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(2), pages 395-421, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Aaron L. Bodoh-Creed & Brent R. Hickman & John A. List & Ian Muir & Gregory K. Sun, 2023. "Stress Testing Structural Models of Unobserved Heterogeneity: Robust Inference on Optimal Nonlinear Pricing," NBER Working Papers 31647, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Preyas Desai & Pranav Jindal, 2024. "Getting a Break in Bargaining: An Upside of Time Delays," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 43(6), pages 1260-1278, November.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Matthew Backus & Thomas Blakee & Brad Larsen & Steven Tadelis, 2020. "Sequential Bargaining in the Field: Evidence from Millions of Online Bargaining Interactions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 135(3), pages 1319-1361.
    2. Bradley J Larsen, 2021. "The Efficiency of Real-World Bargaining: Evidence from Wholesale Used-Auto Auctions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(2), pages 851-882.
    3. Vira Semenova, 2023. "Debiased Machine Learning of Aggregated Intersection Bounds and Other Causal Parameters," Papers 2303.00982, arXiv.org, revised May 2025.
    4. Kyungchul Song, 2009. "Point Decisions for Interval-Identified Parameters," PIER Working Paper Archive 09-036, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    5. Victor Chernozhukov & Sokbae Lee & Adam M. Rosen, 2013. "Intersection Bounds: Estimation and Inference," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(2), pages 667-737, March.
    6. Kjell Hausken, 1997. "Game-theoretic and Behavioral Negotiation Theory," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 6(6), pages 511-528, December.
    7. Daido Kido, 2023. "Locally Asymptotically Minimax Statistical Treatment Rules Under Partial Identification," Papers 2311.08958, arXiv.org.
    8. Lixiong Li & Désiré Kédagni & Ismaël Mourifié, 2024. "Discordant relaxations of misspecified models," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(2), pages 331-379, May.
    9. Charles F. Manski, 2003. "Identification Problems in the Social Sciences and Everyday Life," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 70(1), pages 11-21, July.
    10. JoonHwan Cho & Yao Luo & Ruli Xiao, 2024. "Deconvolution from two order statistics," Papers 2403.17777, arXiv.org.
    11. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Raymond J. Deneckere, 1988. "Stationary Sequential Equilibria in Bargaining With Two-Sided Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 784, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    12. Fan, Yanqin & Park, Sang Soo, 2014. "Nonparametric inference for counterfactual means: Bias-correction, confidence sets, and weak IV," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 178(P1), pages 45-56.
    13. Yao Luo & Peijun Sang & Ruli Xiao, 2024. "Order Statistics Approaches to Unobserved Heterogeneity in Auctions," Working Papers tecipa-776, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    14. Send, Jonas & Serena, Marco, 2022. "An empirical analysis of insistent bargaining," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    15. Vikesh Amin & Jere R. Behrman & Jason M. Fletcher & Carlos A. Flores & Alfonso Flores-Lagunes & Hans-Peter Kohler, 2022. "Does Schooling Improve Cognitive Abilities at Older Ages: Causal Evidence from Nonparametric Bounds," PIER Working Paper Archive 22-016, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    16. Giorgio Brunello & Dimitris Christelis & Anna Sanz‐de‐Galdeano & Anastasia Terskaya, 2024. "Does college selectivity reduce obesity? A partial identification approach," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 33(10), pages 2306-2320, October.
    17. Monique De Haan & Edwin Leuven, 2020. "Head Start and the Distribution of Long-Term Education and Labor Market Outcomes," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(3), pages 727-765.
    18. Dominic Coey & Bradley Larsen & Kane Sweeney, 2019. "The bidder exclusion effect," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 50(1), pages 93-120, March.
    19. Satterthwaite, Mark A. & Williams, Steven R. & Zachariadis, Konstantinos E., 2014. "Optimality versus practicality in market design: A comparison of two double auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 248-263.
    20. Ho, Kate & Rosen, Adam M., 2015. "Partial Identification in Applied Research: Benefits and Challenges," CEPR Discussion Papers 10883, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C57 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Econometrics of Games and Auctions
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L81 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:93:y:2025:i:1:p:161-194. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/essssea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.