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Bargaining With Asymmetric Information: An Empirical Study of Plea Negotiations

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  • Bernardo S. Silveira

Abstract

This paper empirically investigates how sentences to be assigned at trial impact plea bargaining. The analysis is based on the model of bargaining with asymmetric information by Bebchuk, 1984. I provide conditions for the nonparametric identification of the model, propose a consistent nonparametric estimator, and implement it using data on criminal cases from North Carolina. Employing the estimated model, I evaluate how different sentencing reforms affect the outcome of criminal cases. My results indicate that lower mandatory minimum sentences could greatly reduce the total amount of incarceration time assigned by the courts, but may increase conviction rates. In contrast, the broader use of non‐incarceration sentences for less serious crimes reduces the number of incarceration convictions, but has a very small effect over the total assigned incarceration time. I also consider the effects of a ban on plea bargains. Depending on the case characteristics, over 20 percent of the defendants who currently receive incarceration sentences would be acquitted if plea bargains were forbidden.

Suggested Citation

  • Bernardo S. Silveira, 2017. "Bargaining With Asymmetric Information: An Empirical Study of Plea Negotiations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 85, pages 419-452, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:emetrp:v:85:y:2017:i::p:419-452
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    Cited by:

    1. Daiqiang Zhang, 2021. "Testing Passive Versus Symmetric Beliefs In Contracting With Externalities," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 62(2), pages 723-767, May.
    2. Rachel Nesbit, 2022. "The Role of Mandated Mental Health Treatment in the Criminal Justice System," Papers 2212.06736, arXiv.org, revised Nov 2023.
    3. Sultan Mehmood, 2021. "The impact of Presidential appointment of judges: Montesquieu or the Federalists?," AMSE Working Papers 2118, Aix-Marseille School of Economics, France.
    4. Wolton, Stephane, 2018. "Signaling in the shadow of conflict," MPRA Paper 83922, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Pranav Jindal & Peter Newberry, 2022. "The Profitability of Revenue-Based Quotas Under Price Negotiation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(2), pages 917-940, February.
    6. Matthew Backus & Thomas Blakee & Brad Larsen & Steven Tadelis, 2020. "Sequential Bargaining in the Field: Evidence from Millions of Online Bargaining Interactions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 135(3), pages 1319-1361.
    7. Sultan Mehmood, 2021. "The impact of Presidential appointment of judges: Montesquieu or the Federalists?," Working Papers halshs-03161933, HAL.

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