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How Well Does Bargaining Work in Consumer Markets? A Robust Bounds Approach

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  • Joachim Freyberger
  • Bradley Larsen

Abstract

This study provides a structural analysis of detailed, alternating-offer bargaining data from eBay, deriving bounds on buyers and sellers private value distributions using a range of assumptions on behavior. These assumptions range from very weak (assuming only that acceptance and rejection decisions are rational) to less weak (e.g., assuming that bargaining offers are weakly increasing in players' private values). We estimate the bounds and show what they imply for consumer negotiation behavior in theory and practice. For the median product, bargaining ends in impasses in 43% of negotiations even when the buyer values the good more than the seller.

Suggested Citation

  • Joachim Freyberger & Bradley Larsen, 2021. "How Well Does Bargaining Work in Consumer Markets? A Robust Bounds Approach," NBER Working Papers 29202, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:29202
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Aaron L. Bodoh-Creed & Brent R. Hickman & John A. List & Ian Muir & Gregory K. Sun, 2023. "Stress Testing Structural Models of Unobserved Heterogeneity: Robust Inference on Optimal Nonlinear Pricing," NBER Working Papers 31647, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Preyas Desai & Pranav Jindal, 2024. "Getting a Break in Bargaining: An Upside of Time Delays," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 43(6), pages 1260-1278, November.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C57 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Econometrics of Games and Auctions
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L81 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Services - - - Retail and Wholesale Trade; e-Commerce

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