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Pharmaceutical regulation under market integration through parallel trade

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  • Laura Birg

Abstract

In this paper, I study the effect of parallel trade (cross‐border resale of goods without the authorization of the manufacturer) on pharmaceutical regulation. Governments may restrict prices directly (price caps) or limit third‐party payer reimbursement for the drug (reimbursement limits). I find that parallel trade may relax regulation in the source country of parallel imports under both instruments and intensify regulation in the destination country under a reimbursement limit. I also find that parallel trade may change regulatory preferences: under no parallel trade, both the source and destination country set price caps, and under parallel trade, the source country sets a price cap but the destination country sets a reimbursement limit, thereby enforcing a higher price cap in the South. This implies that drug prices are higher under parallel trade in both source and destination countries. Réglementation pharmaceutique dans le cadre de l'intégration du marché par le commerce parallèle. Dans cet article, j'étudie l'effet du commerce parallèle (revente transfrontalière de biens sans l'autorisation du fabricant) sur la réglementation pharmaceutique. Les gouvernements peuvent restreindre les prix directement (plafonnement des prix) ou limiter le remboursement du médicament par les tiers payeurs (limite de remboursement). Je constate que le commerce parallèle peut assouplir la réglementation dans le pays d'origine des importations parallèles avec les deux instruments et intensifier la réglementation dans le pays de destination avec une limite de remboursement. Je constate également que le commerce parallèle peut modifier les préférences réglementaires : en l'absence de commerce parallèle, le pays d'origine et le pays de destination fixent tous deux des plafonds de prix. Dans le cadre du commerce parallèle, le pays d'origine fixe un plafond de prix, mais le pays de destination fixe une limite de remboursement, imposant ainsi un plafond de prix plus élevé en aval. Cela signifie que les prix des médicaments sont plus élevés dans le cadre du commerce parallèle, tant dans le pays d'origine que dans le pays de destination.

Suggested Citation

  • Laura Birg, 2023. "Pharmaceutical regulation under market integration through parallel trade," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 56(4), pages 1322-1346, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:canjec:v:56:y:2023:i:4:p:1322-1346
    DOI: 10.1111/caje.12647
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bennato, Anna Rita & Valletti, Tommaso, 2014. "Pharmaceutical innovation and parallel trade," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 83-92.
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    5. repec:oup:ecpoli:v:20:y:2005:i:44:p:751-798 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Tomaso Duso & Annika Herr & Moritz Suppliet, 2014. "The Welfare Impact Of Parallel Imports: A Structural Approach Applied To The German Market For Oral Anti‐Diabetics," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(9), pages 1036-1057, September.
    7. Brekke, Kurt R. & Holmas, Tor Helge & Straume, Odd Rune, 2011. "Reference pricing, competition, and pharmaceutical expenditures: Theory and evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(7), pages 624-638.
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    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health

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