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Foreign Aid and Undeserved Credit Claiming

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  • Cesi Cruz
  • Christina J. Schneider

Abstract

Politicians in developing countries misuse foreign aid to get reelected by fiscally manipulating foreign aid resources or domestic budgets. Our article suggests another mechanism that does not require politicians to have any control over foreign aid in order to make use of it for electoral purposes: undeserved credit claiming. We analyze the conditions under which local politicians can undeservedly take credit for the receipt of foreign aid and thereby boost their chances of reelection. We theorize that politicians can employ a variety of techniques to claim credit for development aid even when they have little or no influence on its actual allocation. Using a subnational World Bank development program in the Philippines, we demonstrate that credit claiming is an important strategy to exploit foreign aid inflows and that the political effects of aid can persist even when projects are designed to minimize the diversion or misuse of funds.

Suggested Citation

  • Cesi Cruz & Christina J. Schneider, 2017. "Foreign Aid and Undeserved Credit Claiming," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 61(2), pages 396-408, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:61:y:2017:i:2:p:396-408
    DOI: 10.1111/ajps.12285
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. World Bank, 2005. "CDD (Community Driven Development) and Social Capital Impact : Designing a Baseline Survey in the Philippines," World Bank Publications - Reports 8652, The World Bank Group.
    2. Labonne, Julien & Chase, Robert S., 2009. "Who is at the Wheel When Communities Drive Development? Evidence from the Philippines," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 219-231, January.
    3. Paul Clist & Alessia Isopi & Oliver Morrissey, 2012. "Selectivity on aid modality: Determinants of budget support from multilateral donors," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 267-284, September.
    4. Mary Kay Gugerty & Michael Kremer, 2008. "Outside Funding and the Dynamics of Participation in Community Associations," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 52(3), pages 585-602, July.
    5. Labonne, Julien, 2016. "Local political business cycles: Evidence from Philippine municipalities," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 56-62.
    6. Labonne, Julien, 2013. "The local electoral impacts of conditional cash transfers," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 73-88.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Dreher, Axel & Fuchs, Andreas & Hodler, Roland & Parks, Bradley C. & Raschky, Paul A. & Tierney, Michael J., 2019. "African leaders and the geography of China's foreign assistance," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(C), pages 44-71.
    3. Dragan Filipovich & Miguel Niño-Zarazúa & Alma Santillán Hernández, 2018. "Campaign externalities, programmatic spending, and voting preferences in rural Mexico: The case of Progresa-Oportunidades-Prospera programme," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2018-27, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    4. Allison Carnegie & Kimberly Howe & Adam Lichtenheld & Dipali Mukhopadhyay, 2022. "The effects of foreign aid on rebel governance: Evidence from a large‐scale US aid program in Syria," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(1), pages 41-66, March.
    5. Dreher, Axel & Lang, Valentin & Reinsberg, Bernhard, 2024. "Aid effectiveness and donor motives," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 176(C).
    6. Bai, Yu & Li, Yanjun & Wang, Yunuo, 2022. "Chinese aid and local political attitudes," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).
    7. Toke S. Aidt & Facundo Albornoz & Esther Hauk, 2021. "Foreign Influence and Domestic Policy," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 426-487, June.
    8. Frey, Anderson, 2019. "Cash transfers, clientelism, and political enfranchisement: Evidence from Brazil," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 1-17.
    9. Langlotz, Sarah & Potrafke, Niklas, 2019. "Does development aid increase military expenditure?," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 735-757.
    10. Alexander Baturo & Julia Gray, 2024. "Leaders in the United Nations General Assembly: Revitalization or politicization?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 19(4), pages 721-752, October.
    11. Dragan Filipovich & Miguel Niño-Zarazúa & Alma Santillán Hernández, 2018. "Campaign externalities, programmatic spending, and voting preferences in rural Mexico: The case of Progresa-Oportunidades-Prospera programme," WIDER Working Paper Series 027, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    12. Ann-Sofie Isaksson & Dick Durevall, 2023. "Aid and institutions: Local effects of World Bank aid on perceived institutional quality in Africa," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 523-551, July.
    13. Maria Perrotta Berlin & Raj M. Desai & Anders Olofsgård, 2023. "Trading favors? UN Security Council membership and subnational favoritism in aid recipients," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 237-258, April.
    14. Downey, Mitch, 2021. "Did the war on terror deter ungoverned spaces? Not in Africa," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 151(C).
    15. Kikuta,Kyosuke & Uesugi.Mamoru, 2022. "Do politically irrelevant events cause conflict? the cross-continental effects of European professional football on protests in Africa," IDE Discussion Papers 866, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization(JETRO).
    16. Kikuta, Kyosuke & Uesugi, Mamoru, 2023. "Do Politically Irrelevant Events Cause Conflict? The Cross-continental Effects of European Professional Football on Protests in Africa," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 77(1), pages 179-216, January.
    17. Kikuta,Kyosuke & Ono, Yoshikuni, 2024. "Global Evidence for the Relevance of Irrelevant Events: International Soccer Games and Leader Approval," IDE Discussion Papers 942, Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization(JETRO).

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