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Compliance in Artisanal Fisheries: Do Morality, Legitimacy, and Peer Effects Matter?

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  • Jorge Dresdner
  • Carlos Chávez
  • Omar Barriga

Abstract

We study the compliance behavior of artisanal fishermen in central-southern Chile. Our empirical analysis explores the role of individual morality, perception of legitimacy, and peer effects as determinant factors in the decision to violate regulations. We control for potential simultaneity bias in the peer effects variable. Our results find evidence that moral standing, peer effects, and legitimacy considerations are important for fishermen's compliance decisions. Policy implications to improve compliance with regulations in artisanal fisheries are discussed.

Suggested Citation

  • Jorge Dresdner & Carlos Chávez & Omar Barriga, 2015. "Compliance in Artisanal Fisheries: Do Morality, Legitimacy, and Peer Effects Matter?," Marine Resource Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(4), pages 349-370.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:mresec:doi:10.1086/682215
    DOI: 10.1086/682215
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Raakjær Nielsen, Jesper, 2003. "An analytical framework for studying: compliance and legitimacy in fisheries management," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 425-432, September.
    2. Carlos Chavez & Hugo Salgado, 2005. "Individual Transferable Quota Markets under Illegal Fishing," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 31(3), pages 303-324, July.
    3. Bodman, P M & Campbell, H F & Skinner, R B, 2002. "The One That Got Away? Crime and Punishment in Queensland's Commercial Fisheries," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(3), pages 320-328, September.
    4. Nøstbakken, Linda, 2008. "Fisheries law enforcement--A survey of the economic literature," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 293-300, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. John Lynham, 2017. "Identifying Peer Effects Using Gold Rushers," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 93(3), pages 527-548.
    2. Zimmerhackel, Johanna S & Pannell, David J & Meekan, Mark & Kragt, Marit E & Rogers, Abbie, 2016. "Diving Tourism and Fisheries in Marine Protected Areas: Market Values and New Approaches to Improve Compliance in the Maldives Shark Sanctuary," Working Papers 243921, University of Western Australia, School of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    3. Wehner, Nicholas & FAO,, 2017. "Improving our knowledge on small-scale fisheries: data needs and methodologies," MarXiv vnwc2, Center for Open Science.

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