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An analytical framework for studying: compliance and legitimacy in fisheries management

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  • Raakjær Nielsen, Jesper

Abstract

In this article an analytical framework for analysing compliance and legitimacy in fisheries management is developed. A precondition for sustainable and efficient fisheries management systems is that the imposed regulations can be controlled and enforced. Furthermore, the management costs shall be reasonable compared to the economic output to be obtained from the fisheries. The analytical framework is based on hypotheses from economic and sociological theories, i.e.: (a) fishers' compliance is determined by economic gains of breaking the rules compared to the risk of being detected, (b) compliance is also determined by the design of the management system and whether the imposed regulations are perceived as legitimate. This relates to both the procedures under which the regulations have been decided and to the contents of the regulations, and (c) institutions play a significant role in coordinating various interests in fisheries management and is further a mean to reduce high transaction costs in fisheries management.

Suggested Citation

  • Raakjær Nielsen, Jesper, 2003. "An analytical framework for studying: compliance and legitimacy in fisheries management," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 425-432, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:marpol:v:27:y:2003:i:5:p:425-432
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kerri Brick & Martine Visser & Justine Burns, 2012. "Risk Aversion: Experimental Evidence from South African Fishing Communities," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 94(1), pages 133-152.
    2. Sundström, Aksel, 2016. "Corruption and Violations of Conservation Rules: A Survey Experiment with Resource Users," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 73-83.
    3. Kaplan, Katherine A. & Ahmadia, Gabby N. & Fox, Helen & Glew, Louise & Pomeranz, Emily F. & Sullivan, Patrick, 2015. "Linking ecological condition to enforcement of marine protected area regulations in the greater Caribbean region," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 186-195.
    4. Aranda, Martin & Murillas, Arantza, 2015. "Allocation of fishing possibilities, incentives and outcomes: Insights from Basque fishermen's organisations in Spain," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 171-178.
    5. repec:kap:enreec:v:67:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s10640-015-9983-0 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Abusin, Sanaa & Hassan, Rashid, 2014. "Legitimacy and ethics or deterrence factors: Which are more important for compliance with regulations among the artisanal fishers of Sudan?," African Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, African Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 9(3), August.
    7. Sawchuk, Jennifer Heibult & Beaudreau, Anne H. & Tonnes, Daniel & Fluharty, David, 2015. "Using stakeholder engagement to inform endangered species management and improve conservation," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 98-107.
    8. Epstein, Graham, 2017. "Local rulemaking, enforcement and compliance in state-owned forest commons," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(C), pages 312-321.
    9. Hugo Salgado & Carlos Chávez, 2016. "Using Taxes to Deter Illegal Fishing in ITQ Systems," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 64(4), pages 709-724, August.
    10. Joseph Luomba & Ratana Chuenpagdee & Andrew M. Song, 2016. "A Bottom-Up Understanding of Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing in Lake Victoria," Sustainability, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 8(10), pages 1-14, October.
    11. Karper, Marjoleine A.M. & Lopes, Priscila F.M., 2014. "Punishment and compliance: Exploring scenarios to improve the legitimacy of small-scale fisheries management rules on the Brazilian coast," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 457-464.
    12. Finkbeiner, Elena M. & Basurto, Xavier, 2015. "Re-defining co-management to facilitate small-scale fisheries reform: An illustration from northwest Mexico," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 433-441.
    13. Alabsi, Natheer & Komatsu, Teruhisa, 2014. "Characterization of fisheries management in Yemen: A case study of a developing country׳s management regime," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 50(PA), pages 89-95.
    14. Parés, Claudio & Dresdner, Jorge & Salgado, Hugo, 2015. "Who should set the total allowable catch? Social preferences and legitimacy in fisheries management institutions," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 36-43.
    15. Ramcilovic-Suominen, Sabaheta & Hansen, Christian P., 2012. "Why some forest rules are obeyed and others violated by farmers in Ghana: Instrumental and normative perspective of forest law compliance," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 46-54.
    16. Schultz, Oliver J., 2015. "Defiance and obedience: Regulatory compliance among artisanal fishers in St Helena Bay," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 331-337.
    17. Hart, Katharine A. & Gray, Tim & Stead, Selina M., 2013. "Consumptive versus non-consumptive use of sea turtles? Stakeholder perceptions about sustainable use in three communities near Cahuita National Park, Costa Rica," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 236-244.
    18. repec:eee:forpol:v:85:y:2017:i:p1:p:114-123 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Ramcilovic-Suominen, Sabaheta & Epstein, Graham, 2015. "The impacts of deterrence, social norms and legitimacy on forest rule compliance in Ghana," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 10-20.

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