An Incentive Model of the Effect of Parental Income on Children
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1086/319556
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Chwe, Michael Suk-Young, 1990. "Why Were Workers Whipped? Pain in a Principal-Agent Model," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 100(403), pages 1109-1121, December.
- Bergstrom, Theodore C, 1989. "A Fresh Look at the Rotten Kid Theorem--and Other Household Mysteries," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(5), pages 1138-1159, October.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Ernesto Dal Bó & Pedro Dal Bó & Rafael Di Tella, 2007. "Reputation When Threats and Transfers Are Available," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(3), pages 577-598, September.
- repec:lan:wpaper:2152 is not listed on IDEAS
- Boadway, Robin & Song, Zhen & Tremblay, Jean-François, 2013. "Non-cooperative pollution control in an inter-jurisdictional setting," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(5), pages 783-796.
- Timothy Goodspeed & Andrew Haughwout, 2012.
"On the optimal design of disaster insurance in a federation,"
Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 1-27, March.
- Timothy J. Goodspeed & Andrew Haughwout, 2006. "On the Optimal Design of Disaster Insurance in a Federation," Working Papers 2006-14, University of Kentucky, Institute for Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations.
- Timothy J. Goodspeed & Andrew Haughwout, 2011. "On the Optimal Design of Disaster Insurance in a Federation," Economics Working Paper Archive at Hunter College 436, Hunter College Department of Economics.
- Timothy J. Goodspeed & Andrew F. Haughwout, 2009. "On the optimal design of disaster insurance in a federation," Working Papers 2009/25, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
- Timothy J. Goodspeed & Andrew Haughwout, 2007. "On the Optimal Design of Disaster Insurance in a Federation," CESifo Working Paper Series 1888, CESifo.
- Pareena G. Lawrence & Marakah Mancini, 2008. "La toma de decisiones de los hogares en Venezuela," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 10(18), pages 213-239, January-J.
- Johan Lagerl–f, 2004.
"Efficiency-enhancing signalling in the Samaritan's dilemma,"
Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(492), pages 55-69, January.
- Johan Lagerlof, 2002. "Efficiency-Enhancing Signalling in the Samaritan's Dilemma," Microeconomics 0207001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Lagerlof, Johan, 2003. "Efficiency-Enhancing Signalling in the Samaritan's Dilemma," CEPR Discussion Papers 3842, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Amihai Glazer & Hiroki Kondo, 2010. "Governmental Transfers Can Reduce a Moral Hazard Problem," Working Papers 101102, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
- James Berry, 2015. "Child Control in Education Decisions: An Evaluation of Targeted Incentives to Learn in India," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 50(4), pages 1051-1080.
- Jara-Díaz, Sergio & Rosales-Salas, Jorge, 2017. "Beyond transport time: A review of time use modeling," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 209-230.
- Denis Beninger & François Laisney, 2006.
"On the performance of unitary models of household labor supply estimated on “collective” data with taxation,"
Cahiers d'Economie et Sociologie Rurales, INRA Department of Economics, vol. 81, pages 5-36.
- Beninger, Denis & Laisney, François, 2006. "On the performance of unitary models of household labor supply estimated on “collective” data with taxation," Cahiers d'Economie et de Sociologie Rurales (CESR), Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique (INRA), vol. 81.
- Denis Beninger & Francois Laisney, 2006. "On the Performance of Unitary Models of Household Labor Supply Estimated on 'Collective' Data with Taxation [Performance des modèles unitaires d’offre de travail des ménages estimés sur la base de ," Post-Print hal-00279374, HAL.
- Denis Beninger & François Laisney, 2006. "On the performance of unitary models of household labor supply estimated on “collective” data with taxation," Post-Print hal-01201136, HAL.
- Rafael Barrera Gutiérrez, 2011. "El vacío institucional en el modelo de elección racional aplicado a la fecundidad," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 13(25), pages 223-248, July-Dece.
- Bond, Philip & Newman, Andrew F., 2009.
"Prohibitions on punishments in private contracts,"
Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 526-540, October.
- Andrew Newman & Philip Bond, 2004. "Prohibitions on Punishments in Private Contracts," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 143, Econometric Society.
- Philip Bond & Andrew F. Newman, 2006. "Prohibitions on Punishments in Private Contracts," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2006-060, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- David Card & Gordon B. Dahl, 2011.
"Family Violence and Football: The Effect of Unexpected Emotional Cues on Violent Behavior,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 126(1), pages 103-143.
- David Card & Gordon Dahl, 2009. "Family Violence and Football: The Effect of Unexpected Emotional Cues on Violent Behavior," NBER Working Papers 15497, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Card, David & Dahl, Gordon B., 2010. "Family Violence and Football: The Effect of Unexpected Emotional Cues on Violent Behavior," IZA Discussion Papers 4869, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- David Card & Gordon Dahl, 2009. "Family Violence and Football: The Effect of Unexpected Emotional Cues on Violent Behavior," RCER Working Papers 546, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Haluk I. Ergin & Serdar Sayan, 1997.
"A Microeconomic Analysis of Slavery in Comparison to Free Labor Economies,"
Economic History
9710001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Haluk Ergin & Serdar Sayan, 1997. "A Microeconomic Analysis of Slavery in Comparison to Free Labor Economies," Working Papers 9708, Department of Economics, Bilkent University.
- Jonathan Conning, 2004. "The Causes of Slavery or Serfdom and the Roads to Agrarian Capitalism: Domar's Hypothesis Revisited," Economics Working Paper Archive at Hunter College 401, Hunter College Department of Economics.
- Robert A. Pollak, 2016. "Marriage Market Equilibrium," NBER Working Papers 22309, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Donald Cox, 2001. "How Do People Decide to Allocate Transfers Among Family Members?," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 514, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Donald Cox & Oded Stark, 2007.
"On the Demand for Grandchildren: Tied Transfers and the Demonstration Effect,"
Chapters, in: Luigino Bruni & Pier Luigi Porta (ed.), Handbook on the Economics of Happiness, chapter 18,
Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Cox, Donald & Stark, Oded, 2005. "On the demand for grandchildren: tied transfers and the demonstration effect," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1665-1697, September.
- Cox, Donald & Stark, Oded, 2004. "On the Demand for Grandchildren: Tied Transfers and the Demonstration Effect," Economics Series 158, Institute for Advanced Studies.
- Cox, Donald & Stark, Oded, 2004. "On The Demand For Grandchildren: Tied Transfers And The Demonstration Effect," Discussion Papers 18751, University of Bonn, Center for Development Research (ZEF).
- Barnet-Verzat, Christine & Wolff, Francois-Charles, 2002.
"Motives for pocket money allowance and family incentives,"
Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 23(3), pages 339-366, June.
- Christine Barnet-Verzat & François-Charles Wolff, 2002. "Motives for pocket money allowance and family incentives," Post-Print hal-03913051, HAL.
- Cigno, A., 2016.
"Conflict and Cooperation Within the Family, and Between the State and the Family, in the Provision of Old-Age Security,"
Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, in: Piggott, John & Woodland, Alan (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 0, pages 609-660,
Elsevier.
- Alessandro Cigno, 2014. "Conflict and Cooperation within the Family, and between the State and the Family, in the Provision of Old-Age Security," CHILD Working Papers Series 22, Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic Economics (CHILD) - CCA.
- Shim, Ilhyock & Sharma, Sunil & Chami, Ralph, 2008.
"A Model of the IMF as a Coinsurance Arrangement,"
Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 2, pages 1-41.
- Mr. Ralph Chami & Mr. Ilhyock Shim & Mr. Sunil Sharma, 2004. "A Model of the Imf As a Coinsurance Arrangement," IMF Working Papers 2004/219, International Monetary Fund.
- Chami, Ralph & Sharma, Sunil & Shim, Ilhyock, 2007. "A Model of the IMF as a Coinsurance Arrangement," Economics Discussion Papers 2007-26, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
- Ralph Chami & Sunil Sharma & Ilhyock Shim, 2005. "A model of the IMF as a coinsurance arrangement," BIS Working Papers 170, Bank for International Settlements.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:109:y:2001:i:2:p:266-280. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Journals Division (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.