Minimum Wage Noncompliance and the Employment Decision
The employment effects of minimum wage noncompliance have been the focus of several theoretical contributions to the minimum wage literature, the dominating conclusion being that the noncomplying employer, while reducing employment below the free-market level, will still employ more labor than he would if complying. Allowing, however, for partial compliance, this study applies a portfolio-choice approach to the employer's problem, concluding surprisingly that the minimum wage law may give rise to a full-compliance employment effect even if it is partially evaded. This result is further shown to hold with regard to labor market laws in general. Copyright 2001 by University of Chicago Press.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:19:y:2001:i:3:p:596-603. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.