Wage discrimination and partial compliance with the minimum wage law
This paper presents a simple model to characterize the discriminatory behavior of a non-complying firm in a minimum-wage economy. In the analysis, the violating firm pays one “favored” group of workers the statutory minimum and the other “non-favored” group of workers a sub-minimum. We find conditions under which law enforcement is ineffective in improving the between-group wage differentials. We show that an increase in the minimum wage raises the sub-minimum wage and employment of workers in the non-favored group, but reduces the employment of workers in the favored group. The effect of the minimum wage increase on total employment is unambiguously negative, however.
Volume (Year): 10 (2007)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| |
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- LaVonne A. Booton & Julia I. Lane, 1985. "Hospital Market Structure and the Return to Nursing Education," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 20(2), pages 184-196.
- Yossi Tobol, 2005. "Wage discrimination as an illegal behavior," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 10(4), pages 1-10.
- Orley Ashenfelter & Robert Smith, 1977.
"Compliance with the Minimum Wage Law,"
478, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:10:y:2005:i:4:p:1-10 is not listed on IDEAS
- George J. Stigler, 1974.
"The Optimum Enforcement of Laws,"
in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 55-67
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Yaniv, Gideon, 1994. "Complaining about noncompliance with the minimum wage law," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(3), pages 351-362, September.
- Alan Manning & Ted To, 2002. "Oligopsony and Monopsonistic Competition in Labor Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(2), pages 155-174, Spring.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:10:y:2004:i:9:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
- Yang-Ming Chang, 1992. "Noncompliance Behavior of Risk-Averse Firms Under the Minimum Wage Law," Public Finance Review, , vol. 20(3), pages 390-401, July.
- A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1999.
"The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law,"
NBER Working Papers
6993, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Grenier, Gilles, 1982. "On Compliance with the Minimum Wage Law," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(1), pages 184-87, February.
- Yaniv, Gideon, 2001. "Minimum Wage Noncompliance and the Employment Decision," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(3), pages 596-603, July.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-07j40001. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (John P. Conley)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.