The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions in Brazil: The Limits of the Inflation-targeting Strategy, 1999-2005
This paper suggests that the time-inconsistency approach is inadequate to analyze the political economy of monetary policy in Brazil. The paper develops an alternative theory that emphasizes distributive conflict, and argues that building credibility with a fixed exchange rate and through inflation-targeting was not central for stabilization. A contested-terrain analysis of the Brazilian case suggests that the current monetary regime benefits financial or rentier interests while the manufacturing sector and workers bear the costs of this policy.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 20 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.tandfonline.com/CRPE20|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/CRPE20|
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:revpoe:v:20:y:2008:i:1:p:95-110. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Michael McNulty)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.