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The Media as a Policy Instrument in Influencing the Business Model of Professional Soccer: Evidence From Italy

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  • Paolo Di Betta
  • Carlo Amenta

Abstract

Italian soccer clubs in the first division have individually sold broadcasting rights for their home matches, until new laws imposed pooling and joint-selling those rights through the league and established a mandatory sharing rule to redistribute revenues in order to improve on-the-pitch competitive balance (CB). This article compares the two institutional designs. While reducing revenue inequality, the new regime distorts allocative efficiency and informational rent appropriation, opens up costly ex post renegotiations and antitrust litigations, and does not improve CB.

Suggested Citation

  • Paolo Di Betta & Carlo Amenta, 2012. "The Media as a Policy Instrument in Influencing the Business Model of Professional Soccer: Evidence From Italy," Journal of Media Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(2), pages 109-129, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:jmedec:v:25:y:2012:i:2:p:109-129
    DOI: 10.1080/08997764.2012.676582
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Joshua D. Angrist & Jörn-Steffen Pischke, 2009. "Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's Companion," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 8769.
    2. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, January.
    3. Frederic Palomino and Luca Rigotti., 2000. "The Sport League's Dilemma: Competitive Balance versus Incentives to Win," Economics Working Papers E00-292, University of California at Berkeley.
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