Access Pricing to a Digital Broadcasting Platform
This article studies a television market where operators can sell access to programs and to advertising time. First, we determine the retail prices paid by viewers and advertisers to a monopoly platform when there are externalities between these two markets. We compare the prices that an unregulated platform would establish with the welfare maximizing prices. Second, we obtain the access charge that an independent programmer should pay to a television platform for using one of his channels. We show that the optimal access charge takes into account the direct cost of access and the platform's opportunity costs in the viewer and advertiser markets, which are affected by the externalities between the two markets.
Volume (Year): 20 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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