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In or out? explaining state shares of the tobacco Master Settlement Agreement

Author

Listed:
  • Donald Lacombe
  • Harold Winter

Abstract

In 1998, 46 states were involved in a Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) with the tobacco industry. The other four states settled on their own. Our goal is to answer a counter factual question: how would these four states have fared had they been included in the MSA? We use data from Viscusi (2002) to explain settlement shares for states participating in the 1998 tobacco MSA, and to predict settlement shares for the four nonparticipating states. We find that two nonparticipating states (Minnesota and Mississippi) may have fared substantially worse had they been included in the MSA.

Suggested Citation

  • Donald Lacombe & Harold Winter, 2004. "In or out? explaining state shares of the tobacco Master Settlement Agreement," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(3), pages 279-285.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:ijecbs:v:11:y:2004:i:3:p:279-285
    DOI: 10.1080/1357151042000286401
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jeremy Bulow & Paul Klemperer, 1998. "The Tobacco Deal," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 29(1998 Micr), pages 323-394.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tobacco Industry; Tobacco Master Settlement Agreement; JEL Classifications: L6; K3;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L6 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing
    • K3 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law

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