On the Appropriateness of Performance-Based Compensation for Supervisory Board Members - An Agency Theoretic Approach
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1080/09638180903487784
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Reichelstein, S, 2000. "Providing managerial incentives: Cash flows versus accrual accounting," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(2), pages 243-269.
- Jeremy C. Stein, 1989. "Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic Corporate Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 104(4), pages 655-669.
- Drymiotes, George, 2007. "The monitoring role of insiders," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 359-377, December.
- George Baker, 2002. "Distortion and Risk in Optimal Incentive Contracts," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 37(4), pages 728-751.
- Kim, Oliver & Suh, Yoon, 1993. "Incentive efficiency of compensation based on accounting and market performance," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1-3), pages 25-53, April.
- Richard M. Cyert & Sok-Hyon Kang & Praveen Kumar, 2002. "Corporate Governance, Takeovers, and Top-Management Compensation: Theory and Evidence," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 48(4), pages 453-469, April.
- Bushman, Robert M. & Indjejikian, Raffi J., 1993. "Accounting income, stock price, and managerial compensation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1-3), pages 3-23, April.
- Ozerturk, Saltuk, 2005. "Board independence and CEO pay," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 260-265, August.
- Demski, JS & Dye, RA, 1999. "Risk, return, and moral hazard," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 37(1), pages 27-55.
- Paul, Jonathan M, 1992. "On the Efficiency of Stock-Based Compensation," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 5(3), pages 471-502.
- Theodor Baums & Kenneth E. Scott, 2005. "Taking Shareholder Protection Seriously? Corporate Governance in the U.S. and Germany," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 17(4), pages 44-63, September.
- Renée B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, 2007. "A Theory of Friendly Boards," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(1), pages 217-250, February.
- Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, 2003.
"Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 71-92, Summer.
- Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," NBER Working Papers 9813, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bebchuk, Lucian Arye & Fried, Jesse, 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," CEPR Discussion Papers 3961, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Bebchuk, Lucian A. & Fried, Jesse M., 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt81q3136r, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Meißner, Fabian & Schneider, Georg & Sureth, Caren, 2013. "The impact of corporate taxes and flexibility on entrepreneurial decisions with moral hazard and simultaneous firm and personal level taxation," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 141, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
- Engel, Pascal J. & Hack, Andreas & Kellermanns, Franz W., 2015. "Setting the right mix—Analyzing outside directors’ pay mix in public family firms," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 130-140.
- Chen, Chen-Wen & Liu, Victor W., 2013. "Corporate governance under asymmetric information: Theory and evidence," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 280-291.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Antonio E. Bernardo & Hongbin Cai & Jiang Luo, 2016. "Earnings vs. stock-price based incentives in managerial compensation contracts," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 316-348, March.
- Renneboog, L.D.R. & Trojanowski, G., 2002.
"The Managerial Labor Market and the Governance Role of Shareholder Control Structures in the UK,"
Discussion Paper
2002-68, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Renneboog, L.D.R. & Trojanowski, G., 2003. "The managerial labor market and the governance role of shareholder control structures in the UK," Other publications TiSEM a30fa565-3ce7-4bc3-b1c6-f, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Renneboog, L.D.R. & Trojanowski, G., 2002. "The Managerial Labor Market and the Governance Role of Shareholder Control Structures in the UK," Other publications TiSEM aee04553-20a7-475a-96e1-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
- Renneboog, L.D.R. & Trojanowski, G., 2003. "The managerial labor market and the governance role of shareholder control structures in the UK," Discussion Paper 2003-013, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
- Dutta, Sunil & Reichelstein, Stefan J., 2004. "Stock Price, Earnings and Book Value in Managerial Performance Measures," Research Papers 1873, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
- George Drymiotes & Konduru Sivaramakrishnan, 2021. "Strategic Director Appointments," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(4), pages 1303-1347, September.
- Renée B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, 2009.
"Strong Managers, Weak Boards?,"
CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 55(3-4), pages 482-514.
- Adams, Renee B. & Ferreira, Daniel, 2009. "Strong managers, weak boards?," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 25857, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Lambert, Richard A., 2001. "Contracting theory and accounting," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-3), pages 3-87, December.
- Broye, Géraldine & François, Abel & Moulin, Yves, 2017.
"The cost of CEO duality: Evidence from French leadership compensation,"
European Management Journal, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 336-350.
- Géraldine Broye & Abel François & Yves Moulin, 2017. "The cost of CEO duality: Evidence from French leadership compensation," Post-Print hal-01744545, HAL.
- Robert M. Gillenkirch & Achim Hendriks & Susanne A. Welker, 2014. "Effects of Executive Compensation Complexity on Investor Behaviour in an Experimental Stock Market," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(4), pages 625-645, December.
- Michelle L. Zorn & Christine Shropshire & John A. Martin & James G. Combs & David J. Ketchen Jr., 2017. "Home Alone: The Effects of Lone-Insider Boards on CEO Pay, Financial Misconduct, and Firm Performance," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(13), pages 2623-2646, December.
- Barbara Schöndube-Pirchegger, 2007. "Corporate Governance, Reputation Concerns, and Herd Behavior," FEMM Working Papers 07006, Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg, Faculty of Economics and Management.
- Stacey Beaumont & Raluca Ratiu & David Reeb & Glenn Boyle & Philip Brown & Alexander Szimayer & Raymond Silva Rosa & David Hillier & Patrick McColgan & Athanasios Tsekeris & Bryan Howieson & Zoltan Ma, 2016. "Comments on Shan and Walter: ‘Towards a Set of Design Principles for Executive Compensation Contracts’," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 52(4), pages 685-771, December.
- Hwang, Byoung-Hyoun & Kim, Seoyoung, 2009. "It pays to have friends," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(1), pages 138-158, July.
- Kato, Takao & Kim, Woochan & Lee, Ju Ho, 2007.
"Executive compensation, firm performance, and Chaebols in Korea: Evidence from new panel data,"
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 36-55, January.
- Kato, Takao & Kim, Woochan & Lee, Ju Ho, 2005. "Executive Compensation, Firm Performance, and Chaebols in Korea: Evidence from New Panel Data," IZA Discussion Papers 1783, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Matthias Kiefer & Edward Jones & Andrew Adams, 2016. "Principals, Agents and Incomplete Contracts: Are Surrender of Control and Renegotiation the Solution?," CFI Discussion Papers 1603, Centre for Finance and Investment, Heriot Watt University.
- Agliardi, Elettra & Andergassen, Rainer, 2009.
"Last resort gambles, risky debt and liquidation policy,"
Review of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 142-155, August.
- Elettra Agliardi & Rainer Andergassen, 2009. "Last resort gambles, risky debt and liquidation policy," Review of Financial Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 18(3), pages 142-155, August.
- E. Agliardi & R. Andergassen, 2006. "Last Resort Gambles, Risky Debt and Liquidation Policy," Working Papers 577, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna.
- Elettra Agliardi & Rainer Andergassen, 2007. "Last Resort Gambles, Risky Debt and Liquidation Policy," Working Paper series 31_07, Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis.
- Neupane, Biwesh & Thapa, Chandra & Marshall, Andrew & Neupane, Suman & Shrestha, Chaman, 2024. "Do foreign institutional investors improve board monitoring?," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
- Dirk E. Black & Ervin L. Black & Theodore E. Christensen & Kurt H. Gee, 2022. "Comparing Non-GAAP EPS in Earnings Announcements and Proxy Statements," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(2), pages 1353-1377, February.
- Calcagno, Riccardo & Heider, Florian, 2004. "Market based compensation, trading and liquidity," DEE - Working Papers. Business Economics. WB wb046224, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de EconomÃa de la Empresa.
- Ahmed, Shaker & Ranta, Mikko & Vähämaa, Emilia & Vähämaa, Sami, 2023. "Facial attractiveness and CEO compensation: Evidence from the banking industry," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 123(C).
- Meißner, Fabian & Schneider, Georg & Sureth, Caren, 2013. "The impact of corporate taxes and flexibility on entrepreneurial decisions with moral hazard and simultaneous firm and personal level taxation," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 141, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:euract:v:19:y:2010:i:4:p:817-835. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/REAR20 .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.