An economic game theory model of subcontractor resource allocation behaviour
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- Richard H. Thaler & Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman & Alan Schwartz, 1997. "The Effect of Myopia and Loss Aversion on Risk Taking: An Experimental Test," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(2), pages 647-661.
- Mike Bresnen & Nick Marshall, 2000. "Partnering in construction: a critical review of issues, problems and dilemmas," Construction Management and Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(2), pages 229-237.
- Eccles, Robert G., 1981. "The quasifirm in the construction industry," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 335-357, December.
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- Kerkhove, L.P. & Vanhoucke, M., 2016. "Incentive contract design for projects: The owner׳s perspective," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 93-114.
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KeywordsDecision making; game theory; lean construction; partnering; resource allocation; subcontracting;
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