An economic game theory model of subcontractor resource allocation behaviour
Periodic review and adjustment of resource allocations to construction projects is critical for subcontractors to maintain profitability under traditional unit price or lump sum contracts. Project managers strive to control subcontractors in an effort to meet budgets and schedules; subcontractors often work on multiple projects simultaneously and strive independently to allocate resources to those projects where they perceive that they will bring maximum utility. An economic game theory model is proposed as a foundation for understanding the behaviour of subcontractors in allocating resources to projects. The model describes the influence of the degree of reliability of the planned schedule on subcontractors' and project managers' behaviours under traditional unit price contracting. Unreliable plans undermine efforts to promote cooperative behaviour.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 24 (2006)
Issue (Month): 8 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.tandfonline.com/RCME20|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RCME20|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Richard H. Thaler & Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman & Alan Schwartz, 1997. "The Effect of Myopia and Loss Aversion on Risk Taking: An Experimental Test," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(2), pages 647-661.
- Mike Bresnen & Nick Marshall, 2000. "Partnering in construction: a critical review of issues, problems and dilemmas," Construction Management and Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(2), pages 229-237.
- Eccles, Robert G., 1981. "The quasifirm in the construction industry," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 335-357, December.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:conmgt:v:24:y:2006:i:8:p:869-881. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Michael McNulty)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.