On the lags between submission and acceptance: are all referees created equal?
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References listed on IDEAS
- Freeman, Richard B, 1997.
"Working for Nothing: The Supply of Volunteer Labor,"
Journal of Labor Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(1), pages 140-166, January.
- Richard B. Freeman, 1996. "Working for Nothing: The Supply of Volunteer Labor," NBER Working Papers 5435, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Freeman, Richard Barry, 1997. "Working for Nothing: The Supply of Volunteer Labor," Scholarly Articles 4632239, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Glazer, Jacob & Rubinstein, Ariel, 1996. "What Motives Should Guide Referees? On The Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions," Working Papers 96-01, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Glazer, J. & Rubinstein, A., 1996. "What Motives Should Guide Referees? On the Design of Mechanisms to Elict Options," Papers 3-96, Tel Aviv - the Sackler Institute of Economic Studies.
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