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Discretionary write-downs, write-offs, and other restructuring provisions: a signaling approach

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  • Pascal Frantz

Abstract

This paper introduces a model seeking to explain the discretionary write-downs, write-offs, and other restructuring provisions reported by managers. The model comprises a firm, a manager, and a financial market. The firm is about to be restructured. The manager has some private information about the likelihood of success of his restructuring action. The manager may recognise all or part of the expenditure associated with his future restructuring action by reporting a discretionary restructuring provision. The manager chooses whether or not to report a provision, recognising the impact of the provision on his compensation. The paper shows how, under certain conditions, the manager may credibly communicate his private information to investors through his provision policy. Testable implications are consistent with the empirical evidence reported by Strong and Meyer (1987), Elliott and Shaw (1988), and Zucca and Campbell (1992).

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  • Pascal Frantz, 1999. "Discretionary write-downs, write-offs, and other restructuring provisions: a signaling approach," Accounting and Business Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 29(2), pages 109-121.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:acctbr:v:29:y:1999:i:2:p:109-121
    DOI: 10.1080/00014788.1999.9729573
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