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The Evolution and Development of the Swedish Insurance Market

Author

Listed:
  • Magnus Lindmark
  • Lars-Fredrik Andersson
  • Mike Adams

Abstract

In this paper we provide an overview of the historical development of the insurance market in Sweden from the eighteenth century up to modern times. We consider theoretical perspectives drawn from the economics and political regulation literature that might help to explain important institutional features of the market - in particular, its oligopoly structure, the lack of foreign participation and the significant presence of mutual forms of organisation. We also offer a prognosis as to the current challenges and prospects of the Swedish insurance market in an increasingly competitive and global market.

Suggested Citation

  • Magnus Lindmark & Lars-Fredrik Andersson & Mike Adams, 2006. "The Evolution and Development of the Swedish Insurance Market," Accounting History Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(3), pages 341-370.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:acbsfi:v:16:y:2006:i:3:p:341-370
    DOI: 10.1080/09585200600969398
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Lars-Fredrik Andersson & Liselotte Eriksson, 2015. "The compulsory public pension and the demand for life insurance: the case of Sweden, 1884–1914," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 68(1), pages 244-263, February.
    2. Gebert Persson, Sabine & Lundberg, Heléne & Elbe, Jörgen, 2014. "On the discursive contest of an international M&A relationship development process within financial services," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 23(6), pages 1064-1073.

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