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Models for the interaction between space services providers and manufacturers of space vehicles

Author

Listed:
  • Dmitry Ivanov

    (Samara State Aerospace University (National Research University), Russian Federation)

  • Elena Belyaeva

    (Samara State Aerospace University (National Research University), Russian Federation)

  • Anastasia Kurilova

    (Togliatti State University, Russian Federation)

  • Elena Popkova

    (Volgograd State Technical University, Russian Federation)

Abstract

The authors have formed the space market structure which is distinguished by the junctional formation of the summed demand for a product or service between the participants at the same stage, which serves as a basis for the formation of demand at the next stages. The peculiarities of participants’ interaction on the space services market are associated with incomplete awareness. It is advisable to use the methodological approach considered in the theory of contracts in the case of asymmetric information to develop models of interaction between market participants. Thus, based on the theory of contracts and taking into account the specifics of interaction in this article the authors have described the models for the generation of an optimal contract for the manufacturer of space vehicles and space services providers. The models are presented for the cases with symmetric and asymmetric information. As a result of solution of the task for the generation of an optimal contract, such parameters of the contract as satellite performance, the price of its information throughput unit, as well as the cumulative indicator of its technical and operational characteristics can be found in the course of interaction between these participants of the space market. The determined parameters of the contract allow maximizing the profit of the manufacturer of space vehicles.

Suggested Citation

  • Dmitry Ivanov & Elena Belyaeva & Anastasia Kurilova & Elena Popkova, 2018. "Models for the interaction between space services providers and manufacturers of space vehicles," Entrepreneurship and Sustainability Issues, VsI Entrepreneurship and Sustainability Center, vol. 5(4), pages 846-857, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:ssi:jouesi:v:5:y:2018:i:4:p:846-857
    DOI: 10.9770/jesi.2018.5.4(10)
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    decision model; contract theory; world space market; generation of an optimal contract; information symmetry; information asymmetry;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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