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The Re-Emerging Role of the State in Contemporary Russia

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  • Nadia Vanteeva

Abstract

I examine ownership structure of Russian firms during the 1998–2006 period, where a greater emphasis is placed on motivations behind increased government ownership in the latter years, when oligarchs’ opportunistic influence on the firm diminished as state ownership correspondingly increased. As this phenomenon is also correlated with improved corporate growth during the period, I argue that state participation in corporate governance acted as an effective substitute mechanism to constrain wealth-tunnelling behaviour of corporate insiders and local bureaucrats in a country defined by a weak property rights system. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2012

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  • Nadia Vanteeva, 2012. "The Re-Emerging Role of the State in Contemporary Russia," Transition Studies Review, Springer;Central Eastern European University Network (CEEUN), vol. 19(1), pages 23-34, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:trstrv:v:19:y:2012:i:1:p:23-34
    DOI: 10.1007/s11300-012-0227-5
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    Cited by:

    1. Vanteeva, Nadia, 2016. "In the absence of private property rights: Political control and state corporatism during Putin's first tenure," Russian Journal of Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 41-55.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    State co-ownership; Corporate governance; Russia; G32; P26; P27;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • P26 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Property Rights
    • P27 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - Performance and Prospects

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