A potential approach for ordinal games
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DOI: 10.1007/BF02579071
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- Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May.
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Cited by:
- Jacques Durieu & Hans Haller & Nicolas Querou & Philippe Solal, 2008.
"Ordinal Games,"
International Game Theory Review (IGTR), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 10(02), pages 177-194.
- Jacques Durieu & Hans Haller & Nicolas Quérou & Philippe Solal, 2007. "Ordinal Games," Post-Print ujm-00194794, HAL.
- Jacques Durieu & Hans Haller & Nicolas Querou & Philippe Solal, 2007. "Ordinal Games," CER-ETH Economics working paper series 07/74, CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich.
- Park, Jaeok, 2015. "Potential games with incomplete preferences," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 58-66.
- Andrea Collevecchio & Hlafo Alfie Mimun & Matteo Quattropani & Marco Scarsini, 2024. "Basins of Attraction in Two-Player Random Ordinal Potential Games," Papers 2407.05460, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2025.
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