Stable syndicates of factor owners and distribution of social output: a Shapley value approach
The purpose of this paper is to examine the incentive of a player to join a syndicate in an environment of team production and payoff distribution according to Shapley value. We consider an economy in which a single output is produced by an increasing returns to scale production function using two inputs: labor and capital. By assuming that syndicates of factor owners can form, we are interested in their stability, i.e., the willingness of the members of the syndicate to stay in the syndicate. Our analysis, based on the Shapley value, allows us to find a fair imputation of the gains of cooperation and the conditions under which syndicates are stable.
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Volume (Year): 39 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 (July)
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- HANSEN, Terje & JASKOLD GABSZEWICZ, Jean, .
"Collusion of factor owners and distribution of social output,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
101, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Hansen, Terje & Jaskold-Gabszewicz, Jean, 1972. "Collusion of factor owners and distribution of social output," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 1-18, February.
- Aumann, Robert J., 1973. "Disadvantageous monopolies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 1-11, February.
- Guesnerie, Roger, 1977.
"Monopoly, syndicate, and shapley value: About some conjectures,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 235-251, August.
- Guesnerie Roger, 1976. "Monopoly, syndicate and shapley value : about some conjectures," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 7604, CEPREMAP.
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