Individual and Collective Wage Bargaining
Wage negotiation is modeled as an oceanic game. The employer and unions (if any) are atomic players, interacting with an 'ocean' of infinitesimal individual, unorganized workers. All workers are equally productive inside the firm but may differ in their outside opportunities. The 'worth' of a coalition is its achievable surplus, and the Shapley value of the c-f game thereby defined provides a plausible, equitable wage settlement. Several different levels of unionization are investigated. It is noteworthy that this approach does not introduce specific bargaining procedures; instead (like the core) it builds on cooperative possibilities present in the economic situation itself. Copyright 1997 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
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Volume (Year): 38 (1997)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Douglas H. Blair & David L. Crawford, 1984. "Labor Union Objectives and Collective Bargaining," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 99(3), pages 547-566.
- Guesnerie, Roger, 1977.
"Monopoly, syndicate, and shapley value: About some conjectures,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 235-251, August.
- Guesnerie Roger, 1976. "Monopoly, syndicate and shapley value : about some conjectures," CEPREMAP Working Papers (Couverture Orange) 7604, CEPREMAP.
- Frank, Robert H, 1984. "Are Workers Paid Their Marginal Products?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(4), pages 549-71, September.
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