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Die Corporate Governance-Berichterstattung des Aufsichtsrats — Eine empirische Untersuchung im deutschen Prime Standard zum Einfluss auf die Unternehmensperformance

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  • Patrick Velte

    (Universität Hamburg)

Abstract

Zusammenfassung In diesem Beitrag wird eine empirische studie vorgestellt, die auf Basis einer auswer-tung von Geschäftsberichten der im DaX30, MDaX und sDaX gelisteten deutschen aktiengesellschaften die Berichterstattung des aufsichtsrats unter besonderer Berück-sichtigung der Gehilfenfunktion des abschlussprüfers analysiert. Die deskriptive statistik zeigt insbesondere Defzite im rahmen der Berichterstattung des aufsichtsrats zur unab-hängigkeit, zu den Fachkenntnissen sowie zur prüfungsmethodik in den betrachteten Indizes des deutschen prime standards auf. ein positiver Zusammenhang zwischen der Indexzugehörigkeit der unternehmen und einer „ofensiven“ Corporate Governance-Berichterstattung konnte (nur) teilweise bestätigt werden. Die Korrelationsanalyse weist insbesondere auf statistisch signifkant positive Zusammenhänge zwischen der Bericht-erstattung zum anforderungsprofl des aufsichtsrats (unabhängigkeit und Finanzexper-tise) und ausgewählten Maßzahlen für die unternehmensperformance (aktienrendite, Kurs-Gewinn-verhältnis, Tobin’s Q und Gesamtkapitalrendite) hin. In einer Gesamtschau sind die festgestellten Korrelationen der betrachteten variablen insbesondere im DaX30 tendenziell schwach.

Suggested Citation

  • Patrick Velte, 2009. "Die Corporate Governance-Berichterstattung des Aufsichtsrats — Eine empirische Untersuchung im deutschen Prime Standard zum Einfluss auf die Unternehmensperformance," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 61(7), pages 702-737, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:61:y:2009:i:7:d:10.1007_bf03373666
    DOI: 10.1007/BF03373666
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    G3; h1; K2; M4;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
    • M4 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting

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