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The effects of board size and ‘busy’ directors on the market value of Italian companies

Author Info

Listed author(s):
  • Roberto Di Pietra

    ()

  • Christos Grambovas

    ()

  • Ivana Raonic

    ()

  • Angelo Riccaboni

    ()

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10997-008-9044-y
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Article provided by Springer & Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA) in its journal Journal of Management & Governance.

Volume (Year): 12 (2008)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 73-91

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Handle: RePEc:kap:jmgtgv:v:12:y:2008:i:1:p:73-91
DOI: 10.1007/s10997-008-9044-y
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Keywords: Accounting valuation; Corporate governance; Board-of-directors’ size; Number of directorships; ‘Busy’ directors;

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. repec:hrv:faseco:30728046 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. La Porta, Rafael & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. " Legal Determinants of External Finance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(3), pages 1131-1150, July.
  3. Eliezer M. Fich & Anil Shivdasani, 2006. "Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(2), pages 689-724, 04.
  4. Volpin, Paolo F., 2002. "Governance with poor investor protection: evidence from top executive turnover in Italy," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 61-90, April.
  5. Yermack, David, 1996. "Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 185-211, February.
  6. Denis, David J. & Sarin, Atulya, 1999. "Ownership and board structures in publicly traded corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 187-223, May.
  7. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. " A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
  8. Cotter, James F. & Shivdasani, Anil & Zenner, Marc, 1997. "Do independent directors enhance target shareholder wealth during tender offers?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 195-218, February.
  9. Richardson, Scott & Tuna, A. Irem & Wysocki, Peter D., 2003. "Accounting for Taste: Board Member Preferences and Corporate Policy Choices," Working papers 4307-03, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
  10. Jiraporn, Pornsit & Davidson III, Wallace N. & DaDalt, Peter & Ning, Yixi, 2009. "Too busy to show up? An analysis of directors' absences," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 1159-1171, August.
  11. Fama, Eugene F & Jensen, Michael C, 1983. "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 301-325, June.
  12. repec:hrv:faseco:30728041 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Brunello, Giorgio & Graziano, Clara & Parigi, Bruno, 2001. "Executive compensation and firm performance in Italy," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(1-2), pages 133-161, January.
  14. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2003. "Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: a survey of the economic literature," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Apr, pages 7-26.
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Cited by:

  1. Pascal Nguyen & Nahid Rahman & Alex Tong & Ruoyun Zhao, 2016. "Board size and firm value: evidence from Australia," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 20(4), pages 851-873, December.
  2. Giuseppe Ianniello, 2015. "The effects of board and auditor independence on earnings quality: evidence from Italy," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 19(1), pages 229-253, February.
  3. Emiliano Carlo, 2014. "Pyramids and the separation between direction and control of non-financial Italian family companies," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 18(3), pages 835-872, August.
  4. Andrea Melis & Silvia Carta & Silvia Gaia, 2012. "Executive remuneration in blockholder-dominated firms. How do Italian firms use stock options?," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 16(3), pages 511-541, August.
  5. Andrea Calabrò & Mariateresa Torchia & Francesco Ranalli, 2013. "Ownership and control in local public utilities: the Italian case," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 17(4), pages 835-862, November.
  6. Drago, Carlo & Millo, Francesco & Ricciuti, Roberto & Santella, Paolo, 2015. "Corporate governance reforms, interlocking directorship and company performance in Italy," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 38-49.
  7. repec:ehu:cuader:15777 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. Marcello Martinez & Mark Jamison & Malin Tillmar, 2013. "Public utilities corporate governance," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 17(4), pages 827-833, November.
  9. Romilda Mazzotta & Stefania Veltri, 2014. "The relationship between corporate governance and the cost of equity capital. Evidence from the Italian stock exchange," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 18(2), pages 419-448, May.
  10. Patrick Velte, 2010. "The link between supervisory board reporting and firm performance in Germany and Austria," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 295-331, June.
  11. repec:kap:jmgtgv:v:21:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s10997-016-9350-8 is not listed on IDEAS
  12. Giulio Greco, 2011. "Determinants of board and audit committee meeting frequency: Evidence from Italian companies," Managerial Auditing Journal, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 26(3), pages 208-229, March.
  13. Hayam Wahba, 2014. "Capital structure, managerial ownership and firm performance: evidence from Egypt," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 18(4), pages 1041-1061, November.
  14. Sofia Larmou & Nikos Vafeas, 2010. "The relation between board size and firm performance in firms with a history of poor operating performance," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 14(1), pages 61-85, February.
  15. Marco Allegrini & Giulio Greco, 2013. "Corporate boards, audit committees and voluntary disclosure: evidence from Italian Listed Companies," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 17(1), pages 187-216, February.
  16. Tatiana Mazza & Stefano Azzali, 2014. "The Severity of Internal Controls over Financial Reporting Deficiencies: Differences among Types and Industries," FINANCIAL REPORTING, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2014(1), pages 55-77.
  17. Siri Terjesen & Eduardo Barbosa Couto & Paulo Morais Francisco, 2016. "Does the presence of independent and female directors impact firm performance? A multi-country study of board diversity," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 20(3), pages 447-483, September.

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