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Strategische Kostenanpassung oder relative Leistungsbewertung — Was ist besser?

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  • Stefan Dierkes

    (Philipps-Universität Marburg)

Abstract

Summary To control decentralized investment or profit center decisions it is recommended to give managers a share in their own profits. But in imperfectly competitive product markets it is better for the rivals to use a relative performance evaluation or a performance evaluation based on adjusted costs. It is still unknown which of these incentive schemes has more benefit for a firm. This article shows that in the case of a symmetric duopoly the relative performance evaluation is superior to the performance evaluation based on adjusted costs and that the uniform choice of the relative performance evaluation is a nash equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Stefan Dierkes, 2004. "Strategische Kostenanpassung oder relative Leistungsbewertung — Was ist besser?," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 56(1), pages 45-59, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:56:y:2004:i:1:d:10.1007_bf03372729
    DOI: 10.1007/BF03372729
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    6. Stefan Dierkes & Stephanie Hanrath, 2002. "Steuerung dezentraler Investitionsentscheidungen auf Basis eines modifizierten Residualgewinns," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 54(3), pages 246-267, May.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    M41; C7;

    JEL classification:

    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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