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Investitionssteuerung, Motivation und Periodenerfolgsrechnung bei ungleichen Zeitpräferenzen

Author

Listed:
  • Robert M. Gillenkirch

    (Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main)

  • Matthias M. Schabel

Abstract

Summary This paper considers the role of accrual accounting in providing investment incentives. In a simple multiperiod principal-agent-framework, an agent has to exert effort to gain access to investment opportunities and makes investment decisions. The agent discounts future cash flows at a higher interest rate than the principal. The principal designs a linear performance fee based on either cash flows or residual income. Two concepts of incentive design are analyzed, goal congruence and preference similarity. It is shown, how the two concepts differ with respect to investment and effort incentives, and how accrual accounting improves the solution to the principal’s problem.

Suggested Citation

  • Robert M. Gillenkirch & Matthias M. Schabel, 2001. "Investitionssteuerung, Motivation und Periodenerfolgsrechnung bei ungleichen Zeitpräferenzen," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 53(3), pages 216-245, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:53:y:2001:i:3:d:10.1007_bf03372648
    DOI: 10.1007/BF03372648
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    3. Feltham, GA & Ohlson, JA, 1996. "Uncertainty resolution and the theory of depreciation measurement," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(2), pages 209-234.
    4. Itami, H, 1975. "Evaluation Measures And Goal Congruence Under Uncertainty," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(1), pages 73-96.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    D82; D92; G31; M41;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D92 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing
    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

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