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Ökonomische Analyse neoklassischer Verträge: Funktion und Wirkweise von Schiedsrichtern und Schlichtern in komplexen Transaktionsbeziehungen

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  • Carsten Becker

    (GIB Gesellschaft für Innovationsforschung und Beratung)

Abstract

Summary This study examines the determinants of a neutral third party’s intervention in complex transaction relations. At its basis there rules the idea that the way through courts in order to get control of opportunism risks is often inefficient and that it would be better to let a third party intervene in functions of supervision and arbitration. The analyses of a third party’s intervention are based on a data sample which gives detailed information about 880 market contracts and co-operation projects. There is a tendency to often let a third party intervene if transaction parties intend to carry out especially high specific investments. Furthermore, third parties play a special role in respect of enforcing different contractual regulations or institutional arrangements. A third party intervenes, for example, in the following cases: if several (equal) partners are involved in a transaction, if hostages have to be exchanged or if sanctions have to be decided.

Suggested Citation

  • Carsten Becker, 2001. "Ökonomische Analyse neoklassischer Verträge: Funktion und Wirkweise von Schiedsrichtern und Schlichtern in komplexen Transaktionsbeziehungen," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 53(1), pages 39-54, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:53:y:2001:i:1:d:10.1007_bf03372641
    DOI: 10.1007/BF03372641
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kronman, Anthony T, 1985. "Contract Law and the State of Nature," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 1(1), pages 5-32, Spring.
    2. Victor P. Goldberg, 1976. "Toward an Expanded Economic Theory of Contract," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(1), pages 45-61, March.
    3. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
    4. Williamson, Oliver E, 1983. "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 519-540, September.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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