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Exploring the Preferences of Parents of Children with Myopia in Rural China for Eye Care Services Under Privatization Policy: Evidence from a Discrete Choice Experiment

Author

Listed:
  • Wen Lin

    (Nanjing Agricultural University)

  • Xiaodong Dong

    (Peking University
    Peking University)

  • Jack Hennessy

    (The Fred Hollows Foundation
    Centre for Health Economics, Monash University)

  • Junling Zhao

    (Peking University
    Peking University)

  • Xiaochen Ma

    (Peking University)

Abstract

Objectives This study aims to measure the preferences and valuations of parents of students with myopia parents for eye care service attributes in rural China, and to quantify the potential welfare impacts of privatization policy on children’s eye care services. Methods A discrete choice experiment was designed and implemented among a sample of parents of children with myopia in rural China. We randomly selected 350 participants from the list of subjects obtained from local town schools and family doctors using a random number table method. The participants were asked to choose between two hypothetical scenarios defined by five attributes: provider type, distance, price, lenses type, and refractionists’ professional competencies. We estimate conditional logit and mixed logit models to approximate individual preferences for these attributes and estimate the welfare effects by calculating willingness to pay. Results Respondents (n = 336) showed a significant preference for public providers of refractive error services, myopia control lenses, and professional refractionists (P

Suggested Citation

  • Wen Lin & Xiaodong Dong & Jack Hennessy & Junling Zhao & Xiaochen Ma, 2024. "Exploring the Preferences of Parents of Children with Myopia in Rural China for Eye Care Services Under Privatization Policy: Evidence from a Discrete Choice Experiment," The Patient: Patient-Centered Outcomes Research, Springer;International Academy of Health Preference Research, vol. 17(2), pages 133-145, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:patien:v:17:y:2024:i:2:d:10.1007_s40271-023-00660-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s40271-023-00660-9
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