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Strategic non-marital cohabitation: theory and empirical implications

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  • Amy Farmer
  • Andrew Horowitz

Abstract

Non-marital cohabitation is a rapidly growing global phenomenon. Prior literature examines the puzzling empirical regularity that premarital cohabitation is associated with higher divorce rates. Since cohabitation should yield improved match-quality information, one might expect the opposite. This result, and its recent weakening, have been explored empirically and produced theoretically using matching models. In this paper, we develop an intra-household bargaining model of alternative dating and cohabitation paths to marriage in which higher relationship exit costs for cohabitors relative to daters generates the observed higher divorce rate. We also show that asymmetric exit costs can produce rejection and generate exits that would not otherwise occur. In addition, we show that even when cohabitors have lower average marriage quality, expected utility for a given match quality is higher, and some utility enhancing marriages that would not have taken place without cohabitation will occur in its presence. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Suggested Citation

  • Amy Farmer & Andrew Horowitz, 2015. "Strategic non-marital cohabitation: theory and empirical implications," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 28(1), pages 219-237, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:jopoec:v:28:y:2015:i:1:p:219-237
    DOI: 10.1007/s00148-014-0517-9
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    Cited by:

    1. Jan Kabátek & David C. Ribar, 2018. "Not your lucky day: romantically and numerically special wedding date divorce risks," Journal of Population Economics, Springer;European Society for Population Economics, vol. 31(4), pages 1067-1095, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cohabitation; Divorce; Economics of the family; Welfare analysis; Game theory; Exit costs; J12;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure

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